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years, if he should so long live; that there should also he a limitation over, to trustees and their heirs, during the lives of the said Earl and Countess, and the survivor of them, to preserve the contingent uses in remainder; and then to the first and every other son of the Countess of Stamford, and the heirs male of the body of such first and every other son; and then to the right heirs of Sir John Maynard.

From this decree the defendants the Earl and Countess of Stamford appealed; and on their behalf it was argued (E. Northey, S. Dodd), that the act of parliament expressly enacted,

that the real estate of the said Sir John Maynard, by his will given or appointed, should go unto, and be held and enjoyed by such person and persons, [34] and for such estates and interests, and in such manner, as in the said will was expressed; and that the trustees should immediately convey the said real estate to such person and persons, and for such estate and estates, as the same were in and by the said will limited and appointed;

and accordingly the decree, on the hearing of the cause, directed the conveyance to be pursuant to the will, and in the words of the act of parliament: and it could not be denied, but that the draft of the conveyance, as approved by the Master, settled the premises to the persons, and to the same estate and estates, as were limited and appointed by the will; it was therefore difficult to imagine, that the act of parliament, which was so very express in confirming the estates appointed by the will, ever intended, that a Court of Equity should have power to direct a conveyance to other uses than what were mentioned in the will; but the decree complained of did so; and was therefore repugnant both to the will and act of parliament, as well as to the former decree. That Sir John Maynard very well knew, bow and in what manner he could devise and dispose of his real estate; and being willing to try the limitation of a remote remainder to the issue male of the sons of his daughters respectively, (when neither of them had any sons living,) which, by the rules of law, he could not limit in certainty, but might, perhaps, in contingency, he thought fit to run the risque of those limitations taking effect, since one daughter, and her sons, as well as the other, would have a chance for the advantage, by the contingency not happening; and this chance having now happened, for the benefit of the Countess of Stamford, it was hoped a Court of Equity could not take it away from her. That as the appellants bad not the least desire to alter the will and act of parliament in any thing, it was not reasonable to put them in a worse condition than the will and act had put them, by which the appellant the Countess was to have an estate in law, conveyed to her for her life, with such remainders over as in the will are mentioned; but by the last decree, some estates, directed both by the will and act, were totally omitted; and other estates, not mentioned therein, were newly created; and this, under pretence of preserving the contingent remainders, when it had not yet been determined, whether they were good or not, and which, by this order, were endeavoured to be made good; so that in effect a new will was thereby made, and the validity of these remainders prevented from being tried at law. That if Sir Henry Hobart and his wife were living, it might very well be supposed, no objection would have been made to the draft of the conveyance, as settled by the Master, for then they and the appellants would have been upon an equal foot; but the life estates of Sir Henry Hobart and his Lady being determined, and the first term for ninety-nine years being now vested in possession in the respondent, their only son, the limitation to the heirs male was endeavoured by this new-intended conveyance to be made good, after the advantage of its being void had accrued to the appellants; and to carry the limitations of the estate farther than could [35] be done, with respect to the Countess, she having, at present, no son to take the term for ninety-nine years; so that, as to her, that term, by this conveyance, was quite lost, although there could be no reason given, why the deaths of Sir Henry Hobart and his Lady should prejudice the appellants. That it must be agreed, several of the limitations in the will were contingent, and might either never happen, or be destroyed; the will itself being an attempt to create a perpetuity, and a new mode of fettering estates, which had not been countenanced either in the Courts of Law or Equity; and therefore, there could be no reason to assist this project in Equity, beyond the words of the will and act of parliament. And if all the contingent uses in remainder, after the term of ninety-nine years to the first son, were void, the reversion of the whole estate would descend to the appellant the Countess, and the respondents, as heirs at law of Sir John Maynard, which would be equally for their advantage. That it was considerable, how far the act of parliament would make good these contingent limitations, and supply the