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to every person in the disabling one; so that if a Provost, sole seised, is disabled by the first, he must therefore be enabled by the second clause; otherwise his power of alienation must, to this day, remain as it was at common law, unlimited and unconfined.

But it is objected, that the Provost derives his title to the lands in question, under the acts of settlement and explanation, made subsequent to the statute of Charles I. which therefore could not extend to lands, of which the Provost was not then seised.

The statute of Charles I. has always been considered as a remedial law, and should therefore receive a liberal construction. The provisions in it are general, and not to be confined to lands only in the possession of ecclesiastical and lay corporations at the time of making the act; they extend clearly to the preservation of all lands of Archbishops, Bishops, Masters and Governors, and Fellows of colleges. But if the lands in question were not bound by this act, they remained as at the common law, without any restriction as to the powers of leasing and alienation.

It is further objected, that the act of settlement directs, that the Lord Lieutenant and council shall prescribe in what manner the lands shall be set out.

But this direction does not in any respect relate to the power of leasing, which is not altered or abridged by any parts of the acts of settlement and explanation; and this point has been already determined, by the unanimous opinion of all the Judges of the Court of King's Bench in England, in the case of Clement and Agar, the executors of Dr. Baldwin, against Waller, on writ of error from the King's Bench in Ireland (4 Burr. 2154). Every lease made in pursuance of the act of Charles I.

is rendered void, if a moiety of the true value of the lands, at the time of making [540] such lease, be not reserved, as the same shall appear either by a legal trial between the successor of the lessor and the lessee, by verdict at common law, or by certificate of commissioners to be appointed by the great seal, which verdict or certificate shall be peremptory to both parties.

The act of Geo. II. repealed the power given to the commissioners to determine questions of value, from whence it manifestly appears, that the legislature wisely judged, that this power was of such importance, as to be trusted only to a jury. Under such a protection, tenants are not exposed to tedious and expensive suits; church and college leases are rendered less precarious; agriculture is encouraged, and lands are greatly improved. The act of Charles I. expressly declares, that questions of value shall be tried by a jury, and a jury only; so that the jurisdiction of declaring the leases to be void on the head of value, is denied to a Court of Equity, not only by the general construction of the Courts of Justice, which does not admit of Courts of Equity assuming a jurisdiction in matters merely cognizable at law; but Courts of Equity are also clearly precluded from any jurisdiction in this case, by act of parliament.

The plea being a good bar to the relief, it was of consequence a good bar in this case to the discovery: because the discovery sought by the bill, was made merely subservient to the relief, and was not a discovery prayed in aid of the legal jurisdiction; for the appellant prayed to be relieved in equity, by having the leases set aside, in exclusion of the legal jurisdiction. The discovery pleaded to, related only to the matter of value; this could be prayed for the purpose only of supporting the first head of relief; and if that relief was improper for equity, the discovery incident to it, must be equally improper. But had the bill been merely for a discovery for the purpose of giving the answer in evidence at law, yet, as this case was circumstanced, a Court of Equity would not have compelled the respondents to make any discovery respecting the value of the lands; no principle being better established, than that equity will not oblige a person to discover a defect in a legal title, when it may occasion a forfeiture by act of parliament. So upon the statute of Henry VIII. of pluralities, the court would not compel a discovery, whether after institution to one living, the defendant was presented to two other livings, and instituted (Boteler v. Allington, 3 Atk. 453). And in the case of Hamilton v. Clements, in the Court of Chancery in Ireland, Clements insisted, that he was not bound to answer even as to the value of a college lease, because the lease would be void, if the reserved rent was less than half the value exceptions were taken to the answer, and it was reported insufficient; but the exception was over-ruled by Lord Bowes, who held, that Clements was not bound to answer to the value, because the lease might be evicted by aid of the answer.