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HUTCHINSON v. GAMBLE [1776]
II BROWN.

Andrews were void, because one moiety of the clear yearly value of the lands was not reserved, according to the intent and meaning of the act of Charles I. 2dly, That though the power of leasing given by this set, had been strictly pursued, the leases made to the respon-[538]-dent Gamble, should be set aside, because the lands in question were not granted to the Provost of Dublin college and his successors, by the statute of Charles I. but by virtue of the acts of settlement and explanation made in the reign of King Charles II. The second part of the relief was founded upon charges, that the college seal, of which the Provost is a trustee, was fraudulently affixed to the leases, without the consent of the Fellows and Scholars; that by some clandestine proceedings, the leases were entered in the registry of the college; that they were made in trust for the late Provost and his representatives; that under such circumstances of fraud and breach of trust, the appellant was entitled to the beneficial interest; and that therefore the respondent Gamble ought to be declared a trustee for the appellant and his successors. The bill also prayed a discovery of the truth of the charges, as applied to each mode of relief; and particularly as to the value of the lands.

The relief founded upon the charges of fraud and breach of trust, was at present out of the question, the respondents having fully answered those charges. Whether therefore the appellant would be able to make out a case to entitle him to the relief prayed under this head, was a matter which must be reserved to the hearing of the cause. However, if the late Provost had been guilty of every species of supposed fraud imputed to him, it would not affect the leases; for it could not be denied, but that he had a right in his politic capacity, and as a sole corporation, to elect, and make use of a seal of office. He affixed not only the college, but his own seal, to the leases which he had an absolute right to make, without the consent of the senior Fellows, who had nothing to do with the lands belonging to the Provost. And as to the leases being made in trust for him and his representatives, it was apprehended, that this could be no objection to the validity of such leases, which were not only warranted by many authorities, but by universal practice. It could make no difference to a successor, whether the beneficial interest was in one person or another. It was clear, that the Provost had a right to make a lease, reserving a rent of half the annual value, and to take a fine for the other half. If the lease was made to a stranger, the fine was taken; if to a trustee for the Provost, he took the beneficial interest instead of the fine; but to the successor, both cases were the same. The only material question therefore was, Whether the power of leasing had been pursued; and whether the successor had every benefit that was intended him. And it was also to be observed, that this part of the relief was impossible, as the trust of the leases, admitting them to be good at law, could not go to a successor.

To the first part of the relief, and to the discovery of the value of the lands, which was the foundation of that relief, the respondents had pleaded the statutes of the 10th and 11th Charles I. and 11th Geo. II. and had therefore insisted, that the validity of the leases was solely determinable at law. That leases of lands belonging to the Provost of Dublin were within those acts, was not [539] only evident from the true construction of them, but was, in the present instance, admitted by both parties, the appellant by his bill having made those very acts part of his case, and the respondents having relied upon them in their plea. Before the act of Charles I. all corporations in Ireland, whether sole or aggregate, had an unlimited power of alienation. To restrain this power, and correct the mischiefs of it, this act was made it is the only one in Ireland, which limits and confines the power of alienation incident to every corporation at common law. The first clause, which is disabling, takes away generally the power of alienation from all ecclesiastical corporations, and from Master Governors, and Fellows of colleges; which was done, as is declared in the preamble of the act, to preserve the inheritance of corporations for the benefit of succession; and in construing this first clause, it would be necessary to give it such an interpretation, as would best answer the avowed purposes of the act. Masters, and Governors, and Fellows of colleges, were expressly disabled, and therefore the words were intended to take in the head of a college, sole seised. The second clause, which is enabling, impowers all those who are disabled by the former clause, to make a partial alienation of their inheritances, under particular restrictions. The enabling clause extends

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