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This demurrer being argued before the Lord Chancellor King, on the 3d of March 1729, his Lordship was pleased to over-rule the same as to setting forth the said case, but to allow it as to all other matters.

The appellant therefore appealed from so much of this order, as over-ruled the first part of his demurrer, contending (P. Yorke, T. Lutwyche), that cases stated for the opinion of counsel, were intended for private instruction and information only, in order to direct parties in the conduct of their affairs, and were frequently stated only on a supposition of facts, for the purpose of introducing the questions proposed; and it would be of the utmost consequence to the property of many families, if any person, by a mere suggestion in a bill in equity, should be allowed to compel a defendant to set out the state of such case or cases, as he might have thought fit to frame for his own private direction, or that his agents might have thought fit to frame for him; and if a precedent of this kind was once established, it would become a common suggestion in all bills in equity. That by the law, and the known practice of all [517] courts of law and equity, no counsellor or attorney can be obliged, or ought to discover any matter which his client reveals to him, or which he knows only from the information of his client; and this is the privilege of the client, and not of the counsel or attorney: but if the expedient in the present case should take place, all this precaution of the law would be eluded, and the client might, upon a bare suggestion, be compelled to discover, not only a case stated for the opinion and advice of counsel, but by parity or reason, a brief, or any other instructions given to his counsel or attorney, and even what had passed at a consultation with them. That the respondent did not merely seek a discovery of some particular fact or circumstance supposed to be stated in the case, but required the whole to be set out in the very words and letters of it; whereas it often happens, that many matters are contained in cases stated for counsel, which no way concern the person seeking such discovery; and this might be the case at present, for any thing that appeared in the cause to the contrary. It was therefore prayed, that such part of the demurrer as had been over-ruled, might be allowed.

On the other side it was said (C. Talbot, L. Stucley), that the state of the case was alledged to be touching bonds which were due to the respondent, and payable by the appellant; and surely a creditor is entitled in a Court of Equity, to have a discovery from a debtor, whether the debt be justly due or not; and for that purpose, to know what the debtor may have written, done, or said concerning the same; and such & discovery it was highly reasonable to require in a case like the present, where the principal defence relied upon, is a presumption of satisfaction arising from the length of time. That the state of the said case was in a matter, where the appellant was not merely concerned in his own right, but as a trustee of the bonds for the respondent, and a trustee also of the estates liable to the payment of them; and besides, no inconvenience could possibly arise to him from making such discovery, but paying the bonds, upon its appearing that they were really due.

Accordingly, after hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the same should be dismissed, and the order therein complained of affirmed. (Jour. vol. 23. p. 607.)

Queen Elizabeth, by letters patent under the great seal of Ireland, dated the 3d of March, in the thirty-fourth year of her reign, granted and ordained, that from thenceforth there should be one college, the mother of an university near Dublin, for the