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of Hercules Rowley in 1742, and could not be revived, or the cause reheard, or an appeal brought by the appellant, for want of privity to his grandfather John Charles, being neither his heir or executor; so that the appellant, who alone was entitled to a renewal of the lease in question, had no remedy left, but that of bringing an original bill to establish his right. That the Register's minutes of the 21st of February 1723, were not pleadable in bar of the appellant's demand, as they were never drawn up into an order, or signed by the Chief Baron, or entered and inrolled, as is necessary for constituting a decree. Minutes are but evidence of the judgment of the court, and the ground-work of the decree; but are by no means conclusive, being often mistaken by the officer, and rectified or varied by the court, upon a summary application; and that they are not conclusive, but remain in the power of the court, was proved by an act of the Court of Exchequer in this very cause, which, on the 10th of February 1763, directed the Register's minutes of their order, made the preceding day, to be struck out of his book; and yet these minutes of the 9th of February 1763, thus struck out, were of equal force with those of the 21st of February 1723, which the respondent had pleaded. That decrees, when completely such by signing and inrolment, can only be set aside by original bill, bill of review, rehearing, or appeal, as the case requires; then only can execution be taken upon them; then only do they become records, pleadable in bar; and then only are they removeable by appeal; but bare minutes of a decree were never yet revived by scire facias, nor execution taken thereon, nor appealed from; and if they want all those essential requisites of a complete decree, they cannot be pleadable in bar; for otherwise the drawing them up into a decree, and signing and inrolling that decree, would not only in many cases be unnecessary, but would in effect afford an easy method of eluding the jurisdiction of the dernier resort. That the length of time between the former and present suit, and the acquiescence insisted on by the respondent's plea, afforded no argument why the court should not now enter into the merits of this cause, for John Charles died within three months after the order of February 1723, before he could rehear the cause, or bring an appeal; and it appeared by that very or-[493]-der, that there was a sum of £150 due to him for his expences in defending the title. Sir Arthur Langford was therefore, in 1710, when Alice Charles the first life dropt, indebted to him in more than the amount of the fine, so that he had virtually received it long within the time prescribed by the covenant; and from his whole behaviour he did not appear to have entertained any notion of a breach of covenant by John Charles, or any culpable neglect in not tendering the fine in due time. That the several tenders afterwards made by him in 1719, to Hercules Rowley, of his utmost demand, without regard to what he himself had a right to deduct, and again renewed by his bill, left it fully in the power of the court to decree an adequate satisfaction, by giving fines at proper periods, as if the lease had been actually renewed in 1711. Upon John Charles's death, matters rested in this uncertain state, until the appellant, the first devisee of the interest in the land, and who had consequently the equitable right of renewal, did, by his guardian, upon the dropping of another of the original lives, renew the former tenders, and also tender the proper fine upon the life just then fallen; so that there had been a continual claim on the part of John Charles the original tenant, and the appellant his devisee, to the renewal in question; but if the plea should stand allowed, the appellant would be absolutely prevented from bringing the true merits of his case into judgment, and excusing the supposed neglect imputed to him, the plea being in bar both to the discovery and the relief; whereas the respondent might have the full benefit of his defence, by a common order made upon pleas of this nature, viz. that the plea should stand for an answer, with liberty to except, and the benefit thereof be saved to the hearing. And therefore it was hoped, that the appellant would not be precluded from bringing his cause to a fair hearing, upon the whole circumstances and merits of the case.

On the other side it was argued (F. Norton, C. Yorke), that the condition of renewal was a precedent one, and no unavoidable accident had happened to intercept or prevent the performance of it. Alice Charles, the first life, died in 1710, and no new life was ever named till thirty-seven years afterwards; an acquiescence which amounted to a derelinquishing of the claim and right of renewal. The appellant's right accrued in three months after the decree of 1723, under the will of John Charles,