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it was but justice that the Court of Equity should protect her, and support the authority of its own decrees. That the demands established by the decrees, were originally of equal degree, and of equal justice with any of the appellants demands; but the decree [482] creditors having, by their diligence and priority of suit, raised the nature of their demands to a superior degree, the executrix was bound by the course of administration to give them a preference; and if a trust creditor, whose remedy lies only in equity, should not have the same advantage of his diligence of suit, and the priority of his decree, as a legal creditor would have from a prior judgment; or if the executor should not be equally protected in the payment of a prior decree, as of a prior judgment, either the equity creditor, or the executor, or both, must be inevitably ruined in all cases of a deficiency of assets.

But it is objected, that the decrees which gave the priority, were obtained by collusion and undue preference; and that therefore, the executrix has no right in equity, to be protected under those decrees: and the instances of collusion and undue preference insisted on by the appellants, are, that the demands in those bills were fictitious that the executrix answered the bills, without the compulsion of process; that the causes were heard upon bill and answer; and that the hearing was expeditiously brought on by consent.

In answer to this objection, and the particulars on which it was founded, the executrix insisted, 1st, That the reality and justice of the demands were established beyond all doubt and contradiction; nor did the appellants examine a single witness to disprove, or draw any suspicion on them. 2dly. That it is far from being any misbehaviour in an executor to answer the demand of an honest suitor, cither at law or in equity, without the compulsion of process; and that the interval of time between filing the bills and the answers, being no less than about five weeks, shewed that there was room enough to have served the process of the court in all its forms. 3dly, As to the hearing of the causes upon bill and answer, it was impossible for the executrix to avoid it; for the plaintiffs having particularly charged in their bills all the circumstances of their demands, and all the facts which were necessary to entitle them to a decree; and having interrogated the executrix in the strictest manner to her knowledge, information, and belief thereof, she could not, without the guilt of perjury, avoid disclosing the whole truth of her knowledge, information, and belief; and if, from the facts she was so bound to disclose, the court thought there was sufficient ground for a decree, there was no foundation for calling it a collusive one. Besides, the respondent had so strict a regard to truth, that the appellants had not been able to falsify her answer in the most minute circumstance; and as the law even allows an executor voluntarily to confess a judgment without the least imputation of fraud, where the debt is real and just; so this case was much more favourable, where the answer to the demand was solemnly put in upon oath, and the justice of it supported by incontestible proof. 4thly, That the circumstance of hearing the causes by consent, had no manner of influence upon the merits, nor was the executrix obliged by the rules of law or equity, to stand out the whole length of the process against suitors, especially the first of all the suitors, or to [483] delay them to the last moment, in order only that the appellants themselves might gain that very preference which they complained of in the respondents; and the rather, as the executrix had in every instance, consistent with her safety, avoided delay and litigation; for her pleas at law, though fourteen in number, and each plea containing 250 sheets, were put in within a third part of the time that was taken to put in her two answers; and the damages were confessed to save the trouble and expence of writs of inquiry; nor was there a single instance of an affected delay on her part, throughout the whole proceedings.

As to the other ground of objection, that equality is the favourite rule of a Court of Equity; and that the executrix ought never to be protected in inclining more to one set of creditors than another: it was answered, that this was an objection rather to the law, than the justice of the decree; for it is not in the power either of a court of law or equity, to make an equality amongst creditors who have claims upon legal assets, which are a fund for the payment of demands in such order and degree as the law has prescribed; and a preference must of necessity be made amongst creditors, where the assets are not sufficient to pay all of them their full demands.