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difficulties in her administration of the testator's assets, it did not arise so much from any defect in the law, as from her own hasty and precipitate proceedings in the causes in the Court of Chancery; which plainly appeared to have been calculated, to give an undue preference to some of her husband's relations and friends. That inconveniencies or difficulties attending executors in the administration of assets, was no reason for the interposition of Courts of Equity, which though of high, yet are of limited authority; and there are many instances where it has been thought proper for the legislature to interpose, and several others yet remain, which a Court of Equity never did relieve against. That the decree of the 25th of January 1731, to which a preference was given by the decree complained of, appeared even by that decree to be wrong; and was conceived to be so in particulars of greater consequence than what were taken notice of by the present decree; and therefore it ought not to have had any aid from the court, or to have been carried into execution by any new decree, till it had been set right by rehearing or appeal, according to the known practice of the court; and as the present decree had reduced or varied the rights of the parties, which had been precisely settled by the former decree, it was apprehended, that two inconsistent decrees were now subsisting, touching those demands. That in the case of equitable assets, Courts of Equity always decree an equal distribution amongst the creditors, without regard to priority; and it was conceived, that to decree a priority upon legal assets, and in favour of those who had originally no lien in law upon those assets, as in the present case, was not only to innovate upon the law, but contrary to the known and allowed maxim in Courts of Equity, that equality is equity.

[481] And in support of the fourth appeal, it was said (C. Clarke, W. Monk), that at the testator's death, all the creditors stood in the same degree, as to their several demands upon his estate, not one of them having, at that time, any priority of claim upon the assets which he left; and as it was agreed on all hands, that his debts were near £100,000 more than his effects would answer, it seemed highly reasonable, that the loss should fall equally on all the creditors, in proportion to their debts; and not that a few should receive their whole demands, and the rest lose the whole, which, according to the present decree, would be the case. That the ancient practice of Courts of Equity, was agreeable to what was now desired; and bills of conformity, as they were called, were allowed of, to compel creditors in cases of this kind, to conform all to one rule, and receive a rateable or proportionable satisfaction for their several debts, where the assets would not extend to make full satisfaction. That in the present unfortunate case, some of the appellants, on the 23d of January 1731, and before any decree or judgment was obtained by any of the parties, filed a bill in the Court of Chancery on behalf of themselves and the rest of the creditors of Morice; praying, that they might all be paid in proportion out of the assets, and that no one creditor, or set of creditors, might be preferred before the rest; but a demurrer was allowed to that bill, as improper; the practice of Courts of Equity not having of late years encouraged such bills.^[1] That Mrs. Morice the executrix, by her bill in this cause, sought to protect herself by the decree of a Court of Equity, in what she had done contrary to all rules of equity; but this bill ought not to have been retained upon any other foundation, than in order to oblige her to conform to those rules: for an executrix, who sees and knows that the fund for the payment of the testator's debts will be very deficient, and therefore gives a preference to some creditors to receive their whole demands, by which means others must lose all their debts, seems to have no right to ask the aid of a Court of Equity to protect her in such manifest partiality. It was therefore prayed by all the appellants, that the decree of the 6th of November 1736 might be reversed; and that all the testator's creditors might be paid in proportion.

To all this reasoning it was answered (D. Ryder, J. Brown, N. Fazakerley), on behalf of the respondent Katherine Morice, that a decree of a Court of Equity has always been considered as equal to a judgment, and if prior in point of time, is preferable in the course of payment; and as the executrix was bound to obey the decree, though at the same time she could not plead it at law in justification of her obedience,