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ment against the respondent Katherine; because the appellants judgment upon the falsification of her plea, attached upon all the assets received by her before the 6th of February 1731; whereas the judgments of assets in futuro, taken against her by the other respondents, could only affect the assets which she received after that time. That the £3000 Bank-[476]-stock, for which Humphry Morice had credit in the appellant's books at the time of his death, and the dividends due thereon, was the only security which the appellants had for their demands, amounting to £28,993 8s. 1d. and therefore it seemed contrary to equity to take from them that security, till their demands were satisfied.

As to the objection, that the respondent Katherine could not at law plead the two decrees obtained against her; and that therefore it was highly reasonable she should be protected in a Court of Equity, in paying obedience to such decrees, which she could not, if she was obliged at law to ratify the demands of the appellants and the other judgment creditors; it was answered, that those two decrees were obtained with her privity and consent; that she put in her answer to both the bills, without being served with any subpoena to appear; and that she consented to the hearing of both those causes, without being served with a subpoena to hear judgment and if she afterwards met with any difficulties in the disposal of her husband's assets, they were brought upon her by her own voluntary act only; and the creditors at law ought not to suffer on her account.

And as to another objection, that executors at law have a right to prefer one creditor before another, by giving judgment to one creditor, and pleading that judgment at law against another creditor; and that there is the same reason, that an executor may submit to a decree in equity, and thereby prefer a creditor, as that an executor may give the like preference by confessing a judgment; it may be answered, that although confessing judgment has been allowed at law, yet it never was countenanced in a Court of Equity; and the reason why an executor has that liberty at law, is in order to defend himself against other actions which might be brought against him, where the assets are not sufficient to pay all the creditors; and therefore, if an executor is sued by two creditors on simple contract, each for £100, and has only £100 assets, it is absolutely necessary for him to confess judgment to one, in order to plead that judgment against the other; because at law he cannot plead an action brought against him for a debt on simple contract, to another action for a debt of an equal nature; and for this reason only it is, that the law allows of an executor's confessing a judgment. But in the present case, the respondent Katherine submitted to the two decrees, with a view only to prefer them, and not by way of defence to the actions brought against her at law; because it was well known, that those decrees could not be pleaded at law; and upon that head of equity, her present bill was framed. Besides, if an executor is entitled to prefer a creditor, by submitting to a decree in his favour, the same rule ought to be observed as to decrees obtained upon the executor's admission of more money than is really due, as is observed at law upon confessing a judgment for a false debt. At law, if judgment is confessed, and afterwards pleaded to an action brought at the suit of another creditor, and upon a replication per fraudem, that the judgment was confessed for more [477] money (though ever so small) than was really due, the executor, for his false plea, must satisfy the whole of such creditor's demand, whether he has assets or not. And in this case, the plea of the executrix had been abundantly falsified by the verdict obtained by the appellants. That the appellants had always been willing to waive any advantage they might have by their verdict, in order to an equal distribution of the assets, between all the simple contract creditors, whether by judgment, decree, or otherwise, and were still willing to come into any measure for sharing the common calamity; but they conceived it to be very hard, that the relations of Mr. Morice should, by the assistance of the executrix, divide the whole assets, and receive their full principal, with interest, at £5 per cent. which would still be running on during the whole progress of the account directed by the decree; it being evidently for the advantage of the decree creditors to obstruct and delay, as much as possible, the taking of such account, they being, in the mean time, to receive so high an interest as £5 per cent. for their whole demands.

The three other appeals were brought by different sets of judgment creditors; and in support of the second appeal it was contended (J. Verney, W. Murray), that