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transactions therein stated to have happened between her said brothers, Meredith and Simon.

In this state the cause rested, until after Sidney Lloyd died; when, upon searching her papers, it was discovered, that, at the time when the note or bill for £300 was obtained from Meredith Lloyd, the appellant prevailed on him to execute a deed-poll, granting all his goods and personal estate to the appellant, for securing the said £300 as owing on a stated account, and in consideration of love and affection; but that, underneath the said note or bill, the appellant wrote a memorandum in the words following, viz. I, the above-named Simon Lloyd, do hereby acquit the above-named Meredith. Lloyd, his executors, etc. of the sum above-mentioned, and declare the deed of gift made by the said Meredith, to me the said Simon, and bearing equal date here with, was in trust for payment of the said Meredith Lloyd's debts, in some convenient time after his decease, and for no other purpose whatsoever. That both these instruments were deposited in the hands of the said Sidney Lloyd; that about three years after Meredith's death, the appellant wrote a letter to the said Sidney, desiring her to send him those instruments, which he called the deed, and stated account; that Sidney having taken copies thereof, returned the originals as desired; but, underneath each of the copies, wrote a memorandum in the words following: viz. This is a true copy, taken by me Sidney Lloyd this day, being the 4th of October 1698, the original my brother Simon Lloyd sent a messenger for that day, it being drawn with his own hand; and that the appellant having, in this manner, got the instruments into his hands, cut off the memorandum at the bottom of the bill or note for £300, and then put the same in suit.

In consequence of this discovery, the respondents, in Trinity term 1704, filed a supplemental bill against the appellant, stating [376] the new matter, and praying relief accordingly; but the appellant, by his answer, positively denied that there was any memorandum or writing under the said £300 note, declaring any trust, or to any other purpose whatsoever; and swore that the said note, and also the bill of sale, were really given for securing the said £300 boná fide, due to him without any manner of trust.

On the 24th of January 1708, the cause was heard before the Lord Chancellor Cowper; when it appearing in proof, that the defendant had threatened, that if the plaintiff Margaret would not settle her estate upon her son John, he would compel her to pay the £300, it was decreed, that upon the plaintiffs making a settlement of the plaintiff Margaret's real estate, to the use of herself for life; with remainder to John her son, by Meredith, in tail; with like remainder to her two other sons Roger and Sidney, successively in tail; the defendants should pay to the plaintiffs £254 (which had been paid out of the court to him) with interest for the same, from the time of his receiving thereof, together with the plaintiffs costs both at law and in that court; and that the said defendant should also deliver up the said note or bill for £300 to the plaintiffs to be cancelled.

From this decree the defendant appealed; insisting (P. King, S. Dodd), that the pretended copies of the said note and memorandum, and of the said bill of sale, ought not to have been admitted as evidence; not only because they were no evidence in law, but also because they were totatly inconsistent with Sidney the sister's answer, (of whose hand-writing the same was supposed to be,) who, if she had taken such copies on the 4th of October 1698, could not, by her answer of the 30th of May 1700, truly swear that she was a stranger to the accounts and transactions between the appellant and the said Meredith: but if the matter appeared doubtful, yet, as being a matter of fact, it ought to have been tried at law, before any decree should have been founded thereon; and the rather, because these pretended copies were not proved to be true copies, but were suspected to be forged; as the respondent's witnesses very much differed from, and contradicted each other, concerning the supposed trust. That the appellant was decreed to pay costs both at law and in equity, whereas if he was liable to pay any costs at all, he ought not to pay the costs at law; where he recovered a verdict upon full proof, and where the respondents plea of plene administravit was falsified by evidence, shewing that sufficient assets had come to their hands. That the proposal of making the settlement was thrown out at the hearing, in order to induce the court to decree against the appellant, there being nothing in issue in the cause relative to such settlement, nor was the appellant any way concerned therein;