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appear to replevy it during the continuance of the Justices in the county, the franchise was forfeited and lost for ever. A franchise being therefore liable to forfeiture without appearance, in a proceeding before the Justices in eyre, from reason by analogy, it should be equally liable in a proceeding before the Court of King's Bench; the contumacy in not appearing, and the presumption arising from it that the party had no defence, being applicable alike in both cases. And it appears accordingly in 2d Inst. 282. and in 15 Edward IV. 7. that in a proceeding upon a quo warranto in the Court of King's Bench, if the party claiming a franchise do not come in within a term after the issuing of the venire facias, the franchise is forfeited and lost for ever. In the present case, therefore, the defendants in the quo warranto stated in the replication having omitted to appear not only for a term, but for a year, the franchises under the above authorities became forfeited and lost for ever, though without appearance, and without the form of final judgment regularly entered up.

4th Objection: That the judgment of seizure quosque, is only process to compel appearance, and no final judgment was entered. Answer: It appears from the above authorities, that before the Justices in eyre it was not necessary that final judgment should be entered up, and that the forfeiture was complete without it; nor indeed could such judgment have been entered up, the party having a right to appear till the last moment of the continuance of the Justices in eyre; and the power of the Justices determining with their continuance in eyre, the right of entering up a judgment determined at the same time. If final judgment was unnecessary in the eyre, it is equally unnecessary in the Court of King's Bench. It therefore was not necessary that any judgment should be entered up. The franchise of being a corporation was [367] extinguished, at the time of granting the charter of Charles the Second, by non-appearance; and if a judgment were necessary, the judgment stated was sufficient. The judgment of seizure extinguishes the franchises, and vests them in the King; and the additional words have no material effect in the present case. The franchises being forfeited, the court had no right to make any further order; and if they had, and the franchises of the corporation were suspended only, and not extinguished, the court never in fact exercised such right, or made such order; and if the franchises that were vested in the King by the judgment of seizure, were subject to be divested upon a future order of the court, yet, not having been so divested, they remained and were vested in him at the time of granting the said charter. And if, by reason of the words superadded to the judgment of seizure, he had only a defeasible interest in the franchises that were the subject of it, his grant of that defeasible interest would nevertheless be good, as appears from the case of Alton Woods, 1 Coke's Rep. 49, B. as well as from other cases.

5th Objection: That a judgment of seizure does not dissolve the corporation. Answer: Where the King can hold the franchise that is forfeited, the judgment of seizure vests it immediately in the King. In cases where he cannot, it takes the franchise from those who have it; as Holt Chief Justice expressly says, 1 Shower, 280. In either case it operates as an extinguishment of the corporation; and these propositions seem sufficiently warranted in the case above referred to, 15 Edward IV. and in the King and Staveton, Yelverton, 192. 2 Bro. Ab. tit. Quo warranto, pl. 11. and title Extinguishment, pl. 42, which are confirmed by cases where, in consequence of a judgment of seizure, corporations have ceased to have existence. The case of the corporation of London was decided upon the same principles; and, notwithstanding the universal unpopularity of the proceedings of the late King James respecting that corporation, and the inclination to defeat them, it appears evident from the 2d William and Mary, c. 8. enacted expressly to reverse that judgment, which was not reversed by a writ of error, and from the arguments of the Judges in the case of the King against the Mayor of the city of London, 1 Shower, 274. that the general opinion at that time was, that the judgment of seizure had dissolved the corporation.

6th Objection: That it should have been a judgment of ouster, and not a judgment of seizure. Answer: Where a party has exercised a franchise by wrong, and without any legal authority or grant, there the proper judgment is a judgment of ouster; but where he had once a right to it, and has since forfeited it by non user or abuse, there the judgment should be a judgment of seizure. In the first case, the King cannot have that which never legally existed. In the second case, he resumes and is restored to that which he is supposed to have originally given; and if it does