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to have been made, being a grant of creation of a new corporation of Mayor and Citizens of Chester, for the purposes of general government within that city, were void, [362] ab initio, the Crown having, at the time of the granting thereof, no power or authority by law, to make letters patent of such tenor or effect, inasmuch as it appears upon the record, that there was, at that time, an existing corporation of Mayor and Citizens of Chester, under the letters patent of King Henry the Seventh and Queen Elizabeth, invested with the government of the city; and two corporations, for the same purposes of government, cannot by law exist, within one and the same place, at one and the same time. That the King could not grant what he had not. By the interlocutory, or quosque judgment stated upon the record, the liberties of the corporation of Mayor and Citizens of Chester were adjudged to be seized into the King's hands, until the court should further order. No writ of seizure is stated to have issued upon this interlocutor or quosque judgment. The King, if he had any thing by the quosque judgment, (which, without a writ of seizure issued upon it, he could not have,) had only a limited and qualified interest, viz. a right to the custody of the corporation, then in being, and acting under the charters of Henry and Elizabeth, subject to the further order of the court. The charter of Charles the Second, under which the defendant's election is stated to have been made, is not a grant or transfer of that right of custody, but is a grant of creation of a new corporation of Mayor and Citizens of Chester. The charter of Charles the Second was therefore void. Shepherd's Abridgment, title Prerogative, p. 91, is express to this point,—"That if the King grant more than he hath, as where he hath a custody of land, and he grants the land itself, his grant is void." "And, ubi eadem est ratio idem est jus," is a maxim of the law. That the Court of King's Bench had in effect adjudged, that the corporation of Chester, existing and acting under the charters of Henry and Elizabeth, was dissolved and annihilated by the judgment of seizure, quosque of Hilary term, 35 & 36 Char. 2d, for default of appearance to the information filed against them. The interlocutory, or quosque judgment stated, had not any such effect in law, it was merely process to compel the appearance of the corporation, by laying a foundation for the issuing of a writ of seizure, the execution of which would have given notice to the corporation of the judgment. No writ of seizure is stated upon the record to have issued, so that it does not even appear that the corporation ever had notice of the judgment quosque, much less that they lost the possession of any thing by it, for the judgment of itself could not affect the corporation, without a writ of seizure; and consequently there was not even a temporary suspension of its corporate functions. That because it was found by the jury, that there never was a final judgment of ouster against the corporation of Mayor and Citizens of Chester, created and confirmed by the charters of King Henry and Queen Elizabeth, without which that corporation could not be destroyed; even supposing, which was not admitted, that such judgment could have had that effect; and consequently the charter of Charles the Second had no legal origin, the object of that charter being to create a new corporation of Mayor and Citizens of the city of Chester, for the same purposes for which the corporation, [363] then in being, was created. There is a plain distinction between quosque and final judgments in point of legal effect, which will appear by referring to the cases cited, and to the forms of the different judgments, and the writs of seizure, which severally issue upon them; and if (as might be contended from the most respectable authorities) the legal effect even of a final judgment, would not have been, wholly, to annihilate the corporate capacity, much less could such effect be ascribed to a quosque judgment. That the letters patent of the late King Charles the Second were either void in themselves, ab initio, or were avoided by matter subsequent to the granting thereof, and previous to the supposed election of the defendant under those letters patent. The power of amotion, contained in the charter of Charles the Second, was illegal, and the charter void. The proviso was repugnant to the nature of the grant. The charter could not operate in the manner and according to the conditions expressed in it. The King was therefore deceived in matter of law; and his grant, not being capable of taking effect according to the intention of the Crown expressed in it, is on that account wholly void. A grant of matter of prerogative, if void in part, must be held to be void in toto. Supposing, however, that the power of amotion, contained in the charter of Charles the Second, was legal, the charter itself has in fact been determined and put an end to by the exercise of that power of amotion, by the order of amoval stated upon