Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/81

foolish lover of Lysis, respecting the style of conversation which he should address to his beloved.

After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, ²¹¹ asks him a new question: 'What is friendship? You, Menexenus, who have a friend already, can tell me, who am always longing to ²¹² find one, what is the secret of this great blessing.'

When one man loves another, which is the friend—he who loves, ²¹³ or he who is loved? or are both friends? From the first of these suppositions they arc driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and neither the two boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of the three or with all pf them. Socrates turns to the ²¹⁴ poets, who affirm that God brings like to like (Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who also assert that like is the friend of like. But the bad are not friends, for they are not even like themselves, and still less are they like one another. And the good have no need of one another, and therefore do not care about ²¹⁵ one another. Moreover there are others who say that likeness is a cause of aversion, and unlikeness of love and friendship; and they too adduce the authority of poets and philosophers in support of their doctrines; for Hesiod says that 'potter is jealous of potter, bard of bard;' and subtle doctors tell us that 'moist is the ²¹⁶ friend of dry, hot of cold,' and the like. But neither can their doctrine be maintained; for then the just would be the friend of the unjust, good of evil.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like, nor unlike of unlike; and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor evil of evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good. What remains but that the indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend (not of the indifferent, for that would be 'like ²¹⁷ the friend of like,' but) of the good, or rather of the beautiful?

But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or good? There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be natural. Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but only accidental to it (for if the evil were essential the body would cease to be indifferent, and would become evil) in such a case the indifferent becomes a ²¹⁸ friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of the evil. In this intermediate 'indifferent' position the philosopher or lover of