Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/43

division of labour which exists in every temperate or well-ordered state. How is this riddle to be explained?

¹⁶³ Critias, who takes the place of Charmides, distinguishes in his answer between 'making' and 'doing,' and with the help of a misapplied quotation from Hesiod assigns to the words 'doing' and 'work' an exclusively good sense: Temperance is doing one's own business;—(4) is doing good.

¹⁶⁴Still an element of knowledge is wanting which Critias is readily induced to admit at the suggestion of Socrates; and, in the spirit of Socrates and of Greek life generally, proposes as a fifth definition, ¹⁶⁵ (5) Temperance is self-knowledge. But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine—what is the subject of temperance or wisdom? ¹⁶⁶ The answer is that (6) Temperance is the knowledge of what a man knows and ¹⁶⁷of what he does not know. But this is contrary to analogy; there is no vision of vision, but only of visible things; no love of loves, but only of beautiful things; how then can there be a knowledge of knowledge? ¹⁶⁸ That which is older, heavier, lighter, is older, heavier, and lighter than something else, not than itself, and this seems to be true of all relative notions—the object of relation is outside of them; at any rate they can only have relation to themselves in the form of that object. Whether there are any such cases of reflex relation or not, and whether that sort of knowledge which we term ¹⁶⁹ Temperance is of this reflex nature, has yet to be determined by the great metaphysician. But even if knowledge can know itself, ¹⁷⁰ how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know? Besides, knowledge is an abstraction only, and will not inform us of any particular subject, such as medicine, building, and the like. ¹⁷¹ It may tell us that we or other men know something, but can never tell us what we know.

¹⁷² Admitting that there is a knowledge of what we know and of what we do not know, which would supply a rule and measure of all things, still there would be no good in this; and the knowledge which temperance gives must be of a kind which will do us good; ¹⁷³ for temperance is a good. But this universal knowledge does not tend to our happiness and good: the only kind of knowledge which brings happiness is the knowledge of good and evil. To this ¹⁷⁴ Critias replies that the science or knowledge of good and evil, and