Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/157

and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, 'Hard is it to be good,' How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem, is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman of Simonides, but apparently only with ³⁴⁰ the intention of flattering him into absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (εἶναι) to be, and (γενέσθαι) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then the word difficult or ³⁴¹ hard is explained to mean 'evil' in the Cean dialect. To all this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims, Socrates slily withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that his assent was only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation ³⁴² of the whole passage. The explanation is as follows:—

The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which is not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is brevity, which was also the style of primitive antiquity ³⁴³ and of the seven sages. Now Pittacus had a saying, 'Hard is it to be good:' and Simonides, who was jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was designed to controvert it. No, ³⁴⁴ says he, Pittacus; not 'hard to be good,' but 'hard to become good.' Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly impressive manner ³⁴⁵ that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon Pittacus. This, though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company, and ³⁴⁷ meets with the special approval of Hippias, who has however a favourite interpretation of his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades to defer.

The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of Socrates on the practice of introducing the poets, who ought not to be allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men's own thoughts should supply them with the ³⁴⁸ materials for discussion. A few soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and Socrates, and then the old question ³⁴⁹ is repeated, 'Whether the virtues are one or many?' To which Protagoras is now disposed to reply, that four out of the five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that the fifth, courage, is unlike the rest. Socrates proceeds to undermine the last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from him the admission that all virtue is in the highest degree good:—