Page:The Dialogues of Plato v. 1.djvu/139
Laches.
voice, mind;—would you not apply the term quickness to all of them?
La. Quite true.
Soc. And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little time—whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action.
La. You would be quite correct.
What is that common quality in all which is called courage? Soc. And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases to which I was just now referring?
Endurance. La. I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.
Soc. But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure. Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very noble quality.
La Most noble, certainly.
Soc. And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?
La. Very noble.
Soc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?
La. True.
Soc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?
La. I ought not to say that, Socrates.
Yes, but it must be a noble or wise endurance. Soc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage—for it is not noble, but courage is noble?
La. You are right.
Soc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?
La. True.
Soc. But as to the epithet 'wise,'—wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man