Page:The Czechoslovak Review, vol4, 1920.pdf/374
Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Roumania—an Entente
By ALEŠ BROŽ
Ever since the proclamation of the independence of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dr. Eduard Beneš has worked unceasingly to bring about the political consolidation of Central Europe for the purpose of preventing the heart of Europe from becoming a new center of disturbance and wars. These endeavors which were begun with the collapse of former Austro-Hungarian monarchy have been systematically continued, and thanks to his untiring efforts, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Rumania, three of the main successors of the defunct Empire, have concluded an agreement to create a peaceable group around which the policies of other States may develop.
These three States, which have inherited important shares of the assets of former Austria-Hungary, have numerous interests in common which make their alliance very natural and, in fact, indispensable. Czechoslovak industries are highly developed and need suitable markets to assure their future prosperity, and thus Rumania and the Balkans will be not merely good neighbors and allies for the young Republic, but also important and comparatively near customers for its export trade.
It need hardly be said that the efforts of Dr. Beneš have no acquisitive purposes. From a territorial and national point of view, the Czechoslovak Republic has an abundance of possessions. The Czechoslovak nation as well as its Minister for Foreign Affairs, while fully conscious of their own capabilities, realise that owing to the numerical strength of the Czechoslovak people, any fresh conquest, instead of strengthening the Republic, would weaken it. Its most urgent need is to consolidate the internal situation, and to ensure exterior safety so that it can devote all its resources to the task of reconstruction particularly economic. The immense natural wealth of the country, together with the high degree of intelligence and the proverbial energy of the Czechoslovaks may be regarded as the best guarantee of the great economic future of this State. But in order to develop all these rich potentialities it is necessary also to establish peace and security on the other side of the Czechoslovak frontiers, so that internal development of the country may not be interrupted or harrassed by conflicts from without.
To re-establish peace and security beyond its borders—one of the main aims of Czechoslovak policy—is also an indispensable condition for the peaceful and the successful development of the Republic. Few politicians have realised this necessity as thoroughly as Dr. Beneš, and few have contrived to proceed as methodically as he has done to attain this end. A few months ago it was he who had the courage to inaugurate relations with Vienna, although this policy was at that time not popular either among the Czechoslovak nationalists or among the Austrians.
The guiding principles of this new Entente between Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Rumania are directed towards fostering peace and liberal ideas. It is aimed not merely against all attempts at reaction which might menace the new States, it is not simply a defensive alliance assuring integrity and independence to the three States concerned, but it is above all a positive agreement to facilitate a return to normal economic conditions, to regulate exchanges of commodities between these countries which have been so severely tried by the war, and to establish a new order of things in accordance with the new political construction of Central Europe.
There has been a severe outbreak of reaction in Hungary. The Magyars desire to reconquer the territories which have been separated for ever from Turanian oppression. The monarchists are striving to bring about a restoration of former Austria-Hungary by means of a Danubian Confederation which would be a second edition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There was a danger that the Magyar magnates might let loose another war to regain the regions liberated from their domination. According to the Peace Treaty of Neuvilly the Magyars ought to have reduced the strength of their army to 30,000 officers and men. Not only have they not done so, but, on the contrary,