Page:The Czechoslovak Review, vol4, 1920.pdf/305
have to-day more than a local significance. It is no exaggeration to speak of an international danger as the future will prove. Hungary is prepared to risk everything, for she thinks she can lose but little—though she may after all still have disappointments to suffer. She seems not to appreciate the dangers of her course. Her political juggling results in the sudden exchange of the red Bolshevist Bela Kun for the Archducal monarchist Joseph Habsburg. The world can be prepared for further surprises. Bolshevism did not vanish, but it waits circumspectly behind the scenes for a convenient moment at which to reappear on the stage. In Poland, too, a social upheaval is pretty imminent. What will be the exact character of this revolution it is difficult to say at present, but certain it is that Poland with all its long eastern frontier borders upon Bolshevist Russia. Russian influence is strong. The recent troubles in Warsaw, reports of which have been intentionally suppressed by the Polish press are a proof of this. Should Poland be successful in acquiring an advantageous connection with Hungary through the Jablunkov Pass, in Spíš and Orava, the Czechoslovak Republic at any critical moment could be threatened from the South and East by a union of such overwhelming forces that it would be quite impossible to ward off serious danger from the West. Besides, Teschen is smouldering ground which can burst into flame at any unguarded moment. The Silesian colliery districts with their inflammable social elements form a very dangerous intermediate ground betwen the destructive Eastern elements and Western civlization. So long as the coal districts of Teschen are under the control of the indisputable intelligence of the Czechoslovak proletariat, so long as order is preserved in the land by the reliable elements of the Czechoslovak nation, not only the Czechoslovak Republic but also the further European West is protected from the danger of Eastern convulsions.
It is not Poland, that extensive but politically immature and unreliable state which can become a strong Eastern rampart for the greater West but the little Czechoslovak Republic which was, in the past, an indestructible barrier against the barbarian hordes of Tartars, Magyars, and Turks and which will still remain in the future a barrier against every enemy of civilization, humanity and order.
These historical facts speak better than any other words. They should be carefully and seriously considered in deciding to settle the tangled Silesian problem by means of a plebiscite in accordance with the Polish proposals, and disregarding historic rights and protests of Czechoslovakia, show an inclination to create a strong Poland and to weaken Czechoslovakia. Such a solution of the Silesian dispute would be a grave political error.
What was the behavior of the Poles during the War? From the very beginning they sent their legions with enthusiasm against the Entente, calling the Czechoslovaks “Czech traitors”. They accepted a so-called liberty from the Germans, united with them and co-operated with them to achieve a German triumph.
On the 6th of August 1919 the anniversary of the day on which the legions were created that fought on the side of Germany and Austria great celebrations took place throughout Poland. These celebrations took place by order of President Pilsudski who, in 1914, as chief commander of the Polish legions, issued a military order, proclaiming every Pole who should take the side of the Entente a traitor.
The Czechoslovaks feel very deeply on this point. The hesitation of the Conference to decide for the simple and most natural solution of the question (Czechoslovakia never regarded it as a question but as a settled matter admitting of no argument) and then the decision in favor of a plebiscite overriding the rights of the nation to the indivisible hereditary territory of the Crown of St. Václav came upon the Czechoslovaks as a humiliation. And it is impossible for them to feel otherwise. The plebiscite means one more postponement, one more delay in making the final decision and it signifies, too, a new period of suffering for the people of the district under the rule of the Poles, a period of persecution which might well remind us of the times of ancient ordeals.
In spite of their dissapointments the Czechoslovaks are in no doubt about the result of the plebiscite. They believe in their rights and their faith is stronger than disappointment and the hostility of others and nothing can break the steadfastness of their hope, their strong will and their work.
The Slav population of Silesia may be divided into three categories: the Czechoslovaks, the Poles and the so-called Silesians. These latter are in reality Bohemians who have been diverted from the common stock by the Habsburgian system of policy and civilization, by the Germano-Polish alliance and by the Germano-Polish school system. These Silesians form the majority and offer a strong resistance to any annexation to the Polish State. They know very well the danger which threatens them and do not hesitate to show that they have nothing in common with the Polish colonists except the language which was forced upon them in Germano-Polish schools. They take it as an offense if one calls them Poles. The word Pole is universally regarded as an epithet of abuse and its use is a ‘casus belli” resulting in an affray to defend the honor of the person so insulted.
The Czechoslovak people were always opposed to the plebiscite. The Poles, however, prevailed in Paris. So long as they expected to find the long-oppressed Silesian people morally and spiritually weak enough to be gained over by threats and terror and violence, their press exulted triumphantly: “Teschen is ours! the plebiscite will prove it!” But when they saw that their judgment