Page:The Czechoslovak Review, vol4, 1920.pdf/142

of view of Czechoslovak foreign policy the Russian problem was never the military problem of Kolchak or Denikin. We never reposed special hopes in the one or the other. Whether Kolchak and Denikin should win or not, whether they were or were not reactionaries, that was not the main thing, as we saw it. What we considered the principal point was, whether Kolchak or Denikin realized what it meant to build a state, to build a Russian and Slav state, what modern democracy signified, what the world war with its political and social demands meant to the Russian situation.

I may state that since March 1919 we received detailed reports from our men in Siberia. After Kolchak had grasped the reins of dictatorship in Siberia, we watched his conduct with eagerness. Uunfortunately all reports showed that Kolchak’s regime was a military regime which was incapable of understanding the administrative needs of the Russian people. The same reports came to us from the beginning about Denikin. We saw that charges of reactionary regime and of persecution had some foundation and that they were caused by the incredible lack of capable men who could take charge of administrative affairs, that they could be traced to an absence of efficient organizers able to apply the principles of modern social policies and not swayed by the romantic ideas of the old regime as to what politics and political work meant.

Why did bolshevism win? First of all, because it was opposed to reaction, because it fought the old regime which everywhere called forth so much dissatisfaction; it triumphed also, because in the first moments of revolutionary work it did not have to carry on constructive policies, but at first destructive measures. It had therefore far easier position that the so-called liberal elements which had attempted to build a new construction through long and weary work. Such work is difficult and very slow, whereas destructive work, social levelling, is very quick and at first successful. It goes without question that we are opposed to bolshevist terrorism, that we are against every anarchy and bolshevism as we see it in Russia. But the question is how to combat such anarchy. We see that the policy of intervention has failed. We do not believe the assertions that if sufficiently strong steps had been taken in time against the bolsheviks, the situation would have been changed. This is a conception of the old regime which does not realize the significance of the world war, the meaning of the present social movement, which does not understand the real Russian problem, how to organize and administer such a state as Russia is with its present population.

It is known that our army against its will and the will of its leaders took part in the fight on bolshevism during the first phase of the intervention policy, when the question was to defeat the Central Powers at any cost. But even then our army fought on the defensive. For that matter it has been the guiding principle of our policy toward Russia to avoid any situation which would compel Slavs on Russian territory to wage a bloody conflict with a part of the Russian nation. The only correct principle for the conduct of the Czechoslovak army in Russia could be noninterference in domestic concerns; when the history of our entire fight for independence is written, it will show that this policy was justified. The Czechoslovak army and the Czechoslovak government did not favor intervention policy and that not merely for political, but also for practical reasons, because our leaders realized that the Allies were not prepared technically or materially to carry out intervention in Russia so as to make it successful. At a time, when our soldiers in Russia were fighting their defensive campaign and should have received help from the Allies, they were unable to get it. We knew what the Russian problem was, and we knew the actual conditions in the Allied camp. The Russian problem could not be solved with arms or with our soldiers.

What will come next and what are we to do about the bolsheviks? As far as we are concerned, the Russian problem is still the same, as it was during the period of intervention, during the campaigns of Kolchak and Denikin; it is all a question of intelligent, able administrators and organizers. If the bolshevist regime has such men, if it realizes that the Russian problem is not answered by the defeat of Kolchak and Denikin, but implies above all modern, progressive and democratic administration and if the bolsheviks can furnish such administration, then this regime may maintain itself and would become the kernel of future Russia. I myself have great doubts of it; even though the bolshevist regime manifested considerable ability both political and military, there is in red Russia great lack of able men who could introduce these new ideas and institutions. But it is only fair to point out that in any case the bolsheviks made a better showing than their enemies, that they appreciated better than the other side that in order to maintain themselves, they must organize and rule, that they introduced a firm military organization, returned to the old army system, that they are coming back to the old capitalistic economy by offering to pay Russia’s debts, to make peace, to take over from the old social structure whatever can be applied—just so they will maintain themselves in power and finish their problem.

The fact that the Allies today accepted the principle of economic relations with the Russian nation means that they have abandoned the policy of intervention; it is the first step toward attempted agreement with the new Russia. It this new Russia will realize what it