angle shrapnel fire, but they make fine targets for the Japanese gunners. Only lately has there been any systematic attempt to disguise these redoubts. Where artillery must be placed on slopes facing and in full view of the enemy, I think it should be protected by bomb-proof fortifications, so constructed as to make it hard to distinguish them from the rest of the landscape. Sky-line positions should never be employed. They can always be avoided. Latterly the Russians have shown better judgment in selecting their artillery positions, and their use of the arm shows decided improvement as the war progresses. In the later battles they have given the Japanese considerable trouble, and their tactics has been in striking contrast to that employed at the Yalu and Wa-feng-goa. They show a growing disposition to concentrate their fire, instead of scattering it all over the place, as formerly. The weapon, personnel, and strength of the Russian artillery are such that it must become formidable as soon as it is employed with reasonable skill, and when this comes to pass one important item of Japanese superiority will terminate. Many errors are still noticeable. There is a tendency to station the caissons and reserve ammunition parks along the roads and near the villages. Of course, adjacency to a road is an advantage in itself; but time after time it has been demonstrated that the Japanese, owing to their excellent maps of the country, are able to locate even the cart roads and place a few batteries where their fire can sweep them. The Japanese seem to have discovered this propensity of their opponents, and use their knowledge to considerable advantage. I have seen reserve parks left absolutely exposed when fairly secure positions for them could have been found within a short distance. The longer ranges of guns, which enable their fire to reach to the rear of elevations at obtuse angles, increases greatly the difficulty of manœuvring reserves of troops and supplies in the vicinity of the firing line; in fact, a large percentage of losses are incurred this way. But this only emphasizes the need for precaution. In such matters, as in most of the details of handling a great modern military machine, the superiority of the Japanese is apparent, and it accounts for much of their success.
Glancing into the future, the tendency of artillery is toward still more powerful guns. The small calibre machine gun is apparently of little use on the battlefield, and its practical utility is confined, so far as land operations are concerned, to fixed fortifications. The weakness of the small machine gun in the field is that its range is only equal to that of the infantry rifle, which places field artillery beyond its reach, and when its fire is able to reach infantry the infantry fire can also reach it. Observation in South Africa convinced me that, by telling off a few marksmen for the purpose, any machine gun can quickly be silenced. During certain stages of an assault it can, perhaps, add to the volume of fire, but its effectiveness over the magazine rifle is open to doubt.
I think a field-piece of smaller calibre and longer range will be the weapon of the immediate future. By reducing the calibre to 2.5 inches (most modern field-guns have calibres ranging from 3.2 to 3.6 inches) greater rapidity of fire can be gained. Reducing the calibre has, also, a tendency to increase the range, which can further be increased by lengthening the barrel of the piece. A reduction of the size of the bullets in shrapnel would give the same probability of hits, besides having a humane bearing. From such study as I have been able to make of artillery fire, I think that decisive results with this arm are only obtained by concentration at critical moments. Even if, in the matter of shrapnel fire, it was found necessary to use fewer bullets in the composition of the shells, the theoretical loss of effectiveness would, it seems to me, be more than compensated by the increased rapidity of fire. My observation inclines me to believe that men are less shaken by large shells which come at considerable intervals than by smaller projectiles which come frequently. The intervals between the larger shells give men time to regain their presence of mind, while a fire so rapid as to be almost continuous leaves them no time to recover and will, if sustained, paralyze their efforts. This is the main object of field artillery fire, and a gun which can accomplish it will be the weapon of the future.
It is interesting to note certain humanitarian aspects of modern war as demonstrated in this conflict. I find myself fully confirmed in a conviction that has been growing for years, and which I have before expressed, that war is growing relatively less dangerous to human life. If this seems to