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mains to battery commanders. Nowadays positions for the artillery are selected by military engineers, after a careful and comprehensive survey of the field and a consideration of the possibilities of the terrain in connection with the general plan of the action and the part assigned to the arm. When this plan is determined, staff officers conduct the batteries to their positions, instruct them as to their targets, the firing ranges, the character of ammunition to be used, and other details. In selecting the positions, the engineers carefully study the terrain with a view to concealing their guns, giving their fire the widest possible scope without changing position, and giving protection from the enemy’s fire not only to the batteries, but to the caissons and reserve ammunition parks. During the battle only the artillery chiefs comprehend what is going on. Battery officers simply see that their guns are handled according to instructions. They regulate the time, speed, objective, and range as ordered. If the action is a large one, they are even denied the satisfaction of observing the effects of the fire of their own guns, for they cannot, even when their target is visible, distinguish it from that of other near-by batteries. The effects of the fire are observed by officers appointed to that duty, stationed at various parts of the field, often miles and miles apart, and who are in constant communication with the chief of artillery by telephone. By the reports of these observers the chief directs the fire of his hundreds of guns. A mounted aide brings a battery commander an order: “Raise your range 500 yards and double the rapidity of your fire.” He obeys without question. Perhaps half an hour later another order will read: “Change your objective to Lone Tree Hill—direction southeast by east—range 4500 yards—use shrapnel.” He changes accordingly. Probably this battery is located on the opposite slope of a hill from the enemy, firing at an angle over the ridge. As likely as not the guns are buried in “gowliang” twelve to fifteen feet in height, with a firing outlet cut by the sabres of the drivers. The battery officers know nothing of the progress of the battle; probably cannot see fifty feet in any direction. Only the ranges give them an occasional clew to the drift of the fight. An order to increase the range argues that the enemy is losing ground, and an order to shorten the range indicates that he is advancing. Even that is mere conjecture. The battery officers and gunners attend to their levelling instruments, see that the range is kept right, watch that the guns do not get too hot, keep close tab on the ammunition, and report concerning it at regular intervals to their divisional chief. If they are being reached by the enemy’s fire there are other matters to attend to. This gun has a wheel smashed; the extra one must be brought from the caisson and the piece got into action again. A breech-block becomes jammed; the battery mechanics must repair it. A caisson is blown up, killing a number of men and horses; others must be brought quickly from the reserve parks. An aide of the divisional chief comes riding along. “General Blank says that your fire seems to be striking slightly to the left of your object. Correct it.” The correction is made. Oh, yes; there is plenty to do, and to do it well requires knowledge and ability. But where is the splendid, dashing artillery of former wars? Gone; and, I think, never to return.

In a previous article I mentioned the growing use of indirect firing, and illustrated it by some incidents. This development was anticipated, and the Japanese have managed it with great skill. They have been able to employ indirect firing to somewhat better advantage than the Russians, because the method is more adaptable to the offensive, which has been the usual attitude of the Japanese so far. It is not always possible to use indirect firing on the defensive, owing to the necessity of employing the fire against advancing infantry, which requires an outlook covering minutely all the approaches to a position. This frequently causes the engineers to place artillery in sky-line positions and on slopes facing the enemy. When this is necessary, fortifications are required. In preparing fortifications for their artillery in this war the Russian engineers have displayed as little intelligence as they did in constructing their infantry fortifications early in the war. A great improvement in the latter is already noticeable, and no doubt this improvement will in time be extended to the artillery. As a rule, the Russians have used old-fashioned fortifications of the open redoubt type to protect their guns. They not only give inadequate protection from a long range, high-