New Features of War
As Illustrated in the East
By Thomas F. Millard
he war now raging in Manchuria affords the first thorough and comprehensive test of up-to-date weapons and equipment since the general reorganization and rearmament which followed the war between France and Germany. Russia’s conflict with Turkey was fought under practically the same conditions that obtained in 1870, before the lessons of the Franco-German War had been shaped into revised equipment and tactics, and the war between Spain and the United States contributed but little upon which any broad conclusions about land operations could be based. South Africa was not without interesting and significant demonstrations; but there, again, inequality of force and equipment, and the almost total lack of military organization of one of the belligerents, left criticism without standards and limited its scope.
But in Manchuria are two carefully organized modern military machines, with the arms and equipment of such, in as great numbers as are likely to be contiguously employed in wars of the future, brought into collision under circumstances which submit all their parts to the test of variable conditions, both in severalty and in combination. Here is the opportunity for which the military world has been waiting, in order to see approved or disproved theories about the future of war so freely advanced in recent years. It is, perhaps, too soon to adopt definite conclusions concerning some important matters; but many significant phases have already developed sufficiently to indicate certain tendencies, and these one may venture to discuss without posing as a prophet.
It may be superfluous to state that only one of the two grand divisions of the art of war is materially affected by improvements in weapons. Strategy is much the same as in the days of Alexander or Hannibal. However, since there is a popular tendency to confuse the two, it may be well to define strategy and tactics. To quote from memory an accepted definition, strategy is the art of manœuvring an army within the theatre of operations so as to increase the probability of victory, increase the consequences of victory, and decrease the consequences of defeat. Tactics is the art of handling and directing the fighting of troops on the battlefield. The disposal of troops upon the battlefield, with such shifting of position as may be necessary during an engagement, is usually called grand tactics, to distinguish from the actual fighting, which is termed minor tactics. While strategy, which embodies a principle the same in all ages, remains comparatively unaffected, tactics, which involves a condition, is amenable to every change in armament, and can never remain the same for two successive generations unless invention sleeps. Thus the art of war is ever new, and nations which aspire to military excellence as a means to defend their interests or advance their ambitions must be constantly alert.
The present war has realized some striking modifications of grand tactics. In olden times, it required some subtlety to distinguish between grand and minor tactics. Armies were able to approach so close to one another without becoming actually engaged that grand tactics consisted of little more than placing troops in certain formations and giving orders for their advance, or passively awaiting the onslaught of the enemy. The whole field was directly under the eyes of the commanders, who could see almost at a glance the course the fight was taking. The constantly widening range of projectiles long ago eliminated those conditions, until now armies are able to inflict great damage upon each other at distances beyond discriminating human vision, even when artificially aided. As battlefields have grown larger, the gap which severs grand from minor tactics has widened, until to-day they stand as almost distinct branches of the art. Never has this been so well demonstrated as in Manchuria.