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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

23. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S LETTER TO U THANT-December 19, 1966. Ambassador Goldberg sent a letter to the Secretary General which referred to Pope Paul's December S appeal that the temporary Christmas truce be transformed into a cessation of hostilities which would become the occasion for sincere negotiations. The Ambassador requested that the Secretary General take whatever steps he considered necessary "to bring about the necessary discussions" which could lead to such a ceasefire. On January 12 Hanoi condemned this initiative.

24. BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES-December 30, 1966. Foreign Secretary Brown addressed messages to the United States, North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam proposing an immediate three-way meeting to arrange a cessation of hostilities.

President Johnson commented on January 1: "We appreciate the interest of all peace-loving nations in arranging a ceasefire, in attempting to bring the disputing parties together, and in an effort to work out a conference where various views can be exchanged.. ."

On January 3, Hanoi denounced the British proposal as a rehash of the "deceitful shopworn clamor of the U.S. imperialists," condemned Foreign Secretary Brown's failure to include the N.L.F. as a participant at the proposed meeting and claimed that the British initiative ran counter to Britain's responsibilites as a Geneva Co-chairman.

25. TET (Lunar New Year) Truce-February 8-13, 1967. The United States suspended bombing for five days and 18 hours after many prior weeks in which the American Government had communicated to Hanoi several possible routes to peace, any one of which the United States was prepared to take. (Four messages were sent to Hanoi in January. Not until January 27 did Hanoi respond, and then only with a diatribe against the United States.)On February 8, President Johnson, in a renewed effort to get talks started, proposed in a letter to Ho Chi Minh that the United States would stop bombing the North and halt any further troop buildup if Hanoi would end its infiltration into South Vietnam. On February 13, Ho's letter to the Pope foreshadowed the rejection of these

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