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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

In a letter to world leaders (24 January), HO CHI MINH repeated earlier criticisms of the U.S. peace drive (a "noisy propaganda drive," an effort to fool public opinion) and termed Johnson's State of the Union statement that the U.S. will not withdraw from Vietnam "an impudent threat." He said the DRV's Four Points were the basis for negotiations. And a fifth point was made: Ho said the U.S. must recognize the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people and engage in negotiations with it." (Ho's letter was released on 28 January. On 12 January 1966, Quan Doi Nhan Dan had declared it "absurd" that "other proposals" --like the U.S. 14 Points -- be discussed. If the U.S. accepts the Geneva Agreements, it should accept the Four Points which are the "sum and substance" of Geneva.)

ALEXANDER SHELEPIN, Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, headed a five-man mission to Hanoi (7 to 12 January 1966). The result: increased Soviet aid to North Vietnam. (Unremitting Chinese attacks on USSR "peace plots" during and after Shelepin's visit may indicate Shelepin discussed - and urged - a negotiated end to the war while in North Vietnam.)

The NLF rejected U.S. peace offers made through intermediaries, according to a 13 January report carried by the official Algerian news agency. The report followed a meeting between President Boumedienne and the NLF representative in Algiers. However, a Viet Cong source in Algiers reportedly hinted that Hanoi might drop the demand for withdrawal of U.S. troops prior to talks if the U.S. agreed to talk directly to the NLF. The source said there could be no change in the NLF position until the U.S. granted it official recognition. Some Front difficulty with Hanoi was indicated, according to American journalists.

U THANT suggested (20 January) that all elements of the South Vietnamese people -- presumably including the Viet Cong -- should be represented in a postwar government. DEAN RUSK (21 January) said he could not report on "any positive and encouraging response (from the other side) to the hopes of ... mankind" for negotiations to end the war in Vietnam. Rejecting U Thant's proposal to promise, or to concede the possibility in postwar government to the NLF, Rusk said the issue must be decided in free elections.

Japanese PREMIER SATO urged (25 January) an international conference be held and appointed M. Yokoyama his special emissary in a peace drive. Sato said the recent mission of Foreign Minister Shiina to Moscow, to secure Soviet support for efforts to begin negotiations, had failed.

On 31 January, PRESIDENT JOHNSON ordered the renewal of air attacks against North Vietnam. He said efforts of U.S. allies had been rebuffed

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