Page:Nature - Volume 1.pdf/251

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
Dec. 30, 1869]
NATURE
237

A PLEA FOR THE MATHEMATICIAN

[At the request of the Editor, Professor Sylvester has furnished the following abridgment of his opening address to the Mathematical and Physical Section of the British Association at Exeter, with some supplemental notes appended in the course of its passing through the press.—Ed.]

I.

IT is said of a great party leader and orator in the House of Lords that, when lately requested to make a speech at some religious or charitable meeting, he declined to do so on the ground that he could not speak unless he saw an adversary before him—somebody to attack or reply to. In obedience to a somewhat similar combative instinct, I set to myself the task of considering certain recent utterances of a most distinguished member of this Association, one whom I no less respect for his honesty and public spirit than I admire him for his genius and eloquence, but from whose opinions on a subject which he has not studied I feel constrained to differ. Göthe has said—

"Verständige Lente kannst du irren sehn
In Sachen mamlich, die sie nicht verstehn."

Understanding people you may see erring—in those things, to wit, which they do not understand.

I have no doubt that had my distinguished friend, the probable President-elect of the next Meeting of the Association, applied his uncommon powers of reasoning, induction, comparison, observation, and invention to the study of mathematical science, he would have become as great a mathematician as he is now a biologist; indeed he has given public evidence of his ability to grapple with the practical side of certain mathematical questions; but he has not made a study of mathematical science as such; and the eminence of his position and the weight justly attaching to his name, render it only the more imperative that any assertions proceeding from such a quarter, which may appear to be erroneous, or so expressed as to be conducive to error, should not remain unchallenged or be passed over in silence.

He says "mathematical training is almost purely deductive. The mathematician starts with a few simple propositions, the proof of which is so obvious that they are called self-evident, and the rest of his work consists of subtle deductions from them. The teaching of languages, at any rate as ordinarily practised, is of the same general nature—authority and tradition furnish the data, and the mental operations are deductive." It would seem from this that, according to Prof. Huxley, the business of the mathematical student is from a limited number of propositions (bottled up and labelled ready for future use) to declare any required result by a process of the same general nature as a student of language employs in declining and conjugating his nouns and verbs; that to make out a mathematical proposition and to construe or parse a sentence are equivalent or identical mental operations. Such an opinion scarcely seems to need serious refutation. The passage is taken from an article in Macmillan's Magazine for June last, entitled "Scientific Education—Notes of an After-dinner Speech," and I cannot but think would have been couched in more guarded terms by my distinguished friend had his speech been made before dinner instead of after.

The notion that mathematical truth rests on the narrow basis of a limited number of elementary propositions, from which all others are to be derived by a process of logical inference and verbal deduction, has been stated still more strongly and explicitly by the same eminent writer in an article of even date with the preceding, in the Fortnightly Review, where we are told that "Mathematics is that study which knows nothing of observation, nothing of experiment, nothing of induction, nothing of causation." I think no statement could have been made more opposite to the facts of the case; that mathematical analysis is constantly invoking the aid of new principles, new ideas, and new methods, not capable of being defined by any form of words, but springing direct from the inherent powers and activity of the human mind, and from continually renewed introspection of that inner world of thought of which the phenomena are as varied and require as close attention to discern as those of the outer physical world—to which the inner one in each individual man may, I think, be conceived to stand in somewhat the same general relation of correspondence as a shadow to the object from which it is projected, or as the hollow palm of one hand to the close fist which it grasps of the other; that it is unceasingly calling forth the faculties of observation and comparison, that one of its principal weapons is induction, that it has frequent recourse to experimental trial and verification, and that it affords a boundless scope for the exercise of the highest efforts of imagination and invention.[1]

Lagrange, than whom no greater authority could be quoted, has expressed emphatically his belief in the importance to the mathematician of the faculty of observation;[2] Gauss has called mathematics a science of the

  1. The annexed instance of Mathematical Euristic is, I think, from its intrinsic interest, worthy of being put on record. The so-called canonical representation of a binary quartic of the eighth degree I found to be a quartic multiplied by itself, together with a sum of powers of its linear factors, just as for the fourth degree it was known to be a quadric into itself, together with a sum of powers of its factors; but for a sextic a cubic multiplied into itself, with a tail of powers as before, was not found to answer. To find the true representation was like looking out into universal space for a planet desiderated according to Bode's or any other empirical law. I found my desideratum as follows: I invented a catena of morphological processes which, applied to a quadric or to a quartic, causes each to reproduce itself; I then considered the two quadrics and two quartics to be noumenally distinguishable (one as an automorphic derivative of the other), although phenomenally identical. The same catena of processes applied to the cubic gave no longer an identical but a distinct derivative, and the product of the two I regarded as the analogue of the before-mentioned square of the quadric or of the quartic. This product of a cubic by its derivative so obtained together with a sum of powers of linear factors of the original cubic, I found by actual trial to my great satisfaction satisfied the conditions of canonicity, and it was thus I was led up to the desired representation which will be found reproduced in one of Prof Cayley's memoirs on Quantics and in Dr. Salmon's lectures on Modern Algebra. Here certainly induction, observation, invention, and experimental verification all played their part in contributing to the solution of the problem. I discovered and developed the whole theory of canonical binary forms for odd degrees, and, as far as yet made out, for even degrees too, at one evening sitting, with a decanter of port wine to sustain nature's flagging energies, in a back office in Lincoln's-Inn- Fields. The work was done, and well done, but at the usual cost of racking thought—a brain on fire, and feet feeling, or feelingless, as if plunged in an ice pail. That night we slept no more. The canonisant of the quartic (its cubic covariant) was the first thing to offer itself in the inquiry. I had but to think the words "Resultant of Quintic and its Canonisant," and the octodecadic skew invariant would have fallen spontaneously into my lap. By quite another mode of consideration M. Hermite subsequently was led to the discovery of this, the key to the innermost sanctuary of Invariants—so hard is it in Euristic to see what lies immediately before one's eyes. The disappointment weighed deeply, far too deeply, on my mind, and caused me to relinquish for long years a cherished field of meditation; but the whirligig of time brings about its revenges. Ten years later this same canonisant gave me the upper hand of my honoured predecessor and guide, M. Hermite, in the inquiry (referred to at the end of this address) concerning the invariantive criteria of the constitution of a quintic with regard to the real and imaginary. By its aid I discovered the essential character of the famous amphigenous surface of the ninth order, and its bicuspidal universal section of the fourth order (otherwise termed the Bicorn), as may be seen in the third part of my Triology, printed in the Philosophical Transactions.
  2. I was under the conviction that a passage to that effect from Lagrange had been cited to me some years ago by M. Hermite of the Institute of France; on applying to him on the subject, I received the following reply:—

    "Relativement à l'opinion que suivant vous j'aurais attribuée à Lagrange, je m'empresse de vous informer qu'il ne faut aucunement, à ma connaissance, l'en rendre responsable. Nous nous sommes entretenus du rôle de la faculté d'observation dans les études que nous avons poursuivies de concert pendant bien des années, et c'est alors, sans doute, que je vous aurai conté une anecdote que je tiens de M. Chevreul. M. Chevreul, allant à l'Institut dans la voiture de Lagrange, a été vivement frappé du sentiment de plaisir avec lequel ce grand géomètre lui faisait voir, dans un travail manuscrit, la beauté extérieure et artistique, si je peux díre, des nombreuses formules qui y figuraient. Ce sentiment nous l'avons tous éprouvé en faisant, avec sincérité, abstraction de l'idée analytique dont les formules sont l'expression écrite. Il y a là, n'est-il point vrai, un imperceptible lien qui rattache au monde de l'art le monde abstrait de l'algèbre et de l'analyse, et j'oserai même vous dire que je crois à des sympathies réelles, qui vous font trouver un charme, dans les notations d'un auteur, et dans les répulsions qui éloignent d'un autre, par l'apparence seule des formules."

    I am, however, none the less persuaded that on one or more than one occasion, M. Hermite, speaking of Lagrange, expressed to me, if not as I supposed on Lagrange's, then certainly on his own high authority, "that the faculty of observation was no less necessary for the successful cultivation of the pure mathematical than of the natural sciences."