Page:Kant's Prolegomena etc (1883).djvu/134

But in this, there is nothing to distinguish it from pure mathematics; it must be defined, therefore, as pure philosophical knowledge; respecting the meaning of which expression, I must refer the reader to the Critique of Pure Reason, (Bohn's Ed. p. 435,) where the distinction between these two modes of the Beason's use are clearly and exhaustively expounded. So much as to the sources of metaphysical knowledge.

Metaphysical knowledge must contain simply judgments à priori, so much is demanded by the speciality of its sources. But judgments, let them have what origin they may, or let them even as regards logical form be constituted as they may, possess a distinction according to their content, by virtue of which they are either simply explanatory and contribute nothing to the content of a cognition, or they are extensive, and enlarge the given cognition; the first may be termed analytic, and the second synthetic judgments.

Analytic judgments say nothing in the predicate, but Avhat was already cogitated in the conception of the subject, though perhaps not so clearly, or with the same degree of consciousness. When I say, all bodies are extended, I do not thereby enlarge my conception of a body in the least, but simply analyse it, inasmuch as extension, although not expressly stated, was already cogitated in that conception; the judgment is, in other words, analytic. On the other hand, the proposition, some bodies are heavy, contains something in the predicate which was not already cogitated in the general conception