Page:Japan by the Japanese (1904).djvu/380

opinion is that, in the present age of keen commercial competition all over the world, it is unwise to devote all our means to the construction of warships, to the sacrifice of undertakings intended for the economic progress of the country. If there is any means by which we can attain our object of commercial supremacy without increasing our fleets, there will be nothing so fortunate for the nation; but, unfortunately, it seems that, under the present state of affairs prevailing in the Far East, it will be impossible to find such a means. From the political and commercial points of view, we can never allow our sea power to diminish, which, if once lost, will never be regained. Under these circumstances, we cannot but express the fullest sympathy with the naval expansion scheme in question, notwithstanding that we fully understand that the economic progress of the empire may be hindered to a certain extent by indulging in military activities, and by curtailing the sphere of remunerative undertakings throughout the country.

As the revolution of 1868 was an event necessitated by the force of circumstances, besides being the restoration of a legitimate authority, it was accomplished with comparative case so far as the transfer of the political power was concerned. Japan had then to enter on a new course in her national and international existence. It was necessary for this hitherto secluded nation fundamentally to remodel its institutions in order to equip itself for the intercourse with the Western countries, and for participation in the general progress of the world. The fall of the Shogunate and the revival of the Imperial rule was thus only the beginning of a difficult and complicated task—the making of a new Japan, of which the establishment of the financial system was an important aspect.

It is not surprising that a Government emerging from the throes of a revolution should be financially embarrassed at the outset. But the case of the Imperial Government just after its return to actual power was a peculiar one owing to the nature of the Government it had replaced. How chaotic were the finances of the new Government may be imagined from the fact that in the first year of its existence the revenue accruing from the taxes was little more than one-tenth of the expenditure, and that the deficit had to be met principally by the issue of inconvertible notes. The items of the revenue in 1868 were as follows: Taxes, 3,157,310 yen; issue of notes, 24,037,390 yen; loans and miscellaneous receipts, 4,732,482