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nately, however, all these rebellions were suppressed before they assumed important dimensions. In 1877, however, there broke forth a war of rebellion in Satsuma. It was the last of its kind and the greatest in magnitude. It was of a most serious nature. Many of the rebels were the veteran soldiers of the Restoration. Nevertheless, the Imperial army proved victorious after many severe engagements.

All these rebellions were vindications of the efficacy of the conscript army, and the Chino-Japanese War of 1894–95 was a crowning triumph for the system. After the war the army of 200,000 was at once increased to some 500,000, although such a sudden augmentation was generally considered to be impossible. Possible or impossible, however, it had to be accomplished. The international relations in the Far East were not ominous, but presented gloomy prospects. The apprehension over some unforeseen events happening was growing more intense. Japan has ever to contribute to the cause of peace in the Far East, and to accomplish this object it was an absolute necessity for her to maintain an efficient army and navy. These it has been her task to obtain, in spite of every difficulty, amongst which must be mentioned the finding of a sufficient supply of highly-trained commissioned as well as non-commissioned officers. Gradually, however, the empire is growing out of all these difficulties.

I must also call to mind the difficulty of keeping pace with the rapid developments in modern weapons. No sooner do the troops learn to use a new and complicated weapon than a still newer and more difficult one has to be adopted.

Before the war with China I had closely examined the military organization of that country, and had discovered that there were some 50,000 men under Li-Hung Chang who were reported to be very well equipped and trained by German officers. Besides this organized army there were supposed to be between 900,000 and 1,000,000 troops in China. Of these, however, only those in the northern provinces were available for action against our armies, about 300,000 men. I therefore ever contemplated that, in case of any emergency leading to war with China, it should be so arranged that 50,000 men of the Japanese army should be devoted to meet the army of Li-Hung Chang, while the other 150,000 could deal with the 300,000 untrained troops available in Pe-Chili and the other northern provinces.

I discovered also a great weakness in the army of Li-Hung Chang, and one which I could appreciate from its resemblance to a weakness which had been encountered at the time of the Restoration in the Imperial army of Japan, which consisted of the feudal retainers under different feudal lords. This weak-