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III

TRUTH[1]

ARGUMENT

Importance of the question What is Truth? when not asked rhetorically.
I. Answers logical. (1) Truth as agreement with reality. Breaks down over the question of the knowledge of this agreement. (2) Truth as systematic coherence. Open to objections on the ground (1) that not all systems true; (2) no system true; (3) many systems are true; (4) truth even if system, is more than system. (1) How about systematic falsehood? (2) How about the imperfection of all actual systems? (3) How about the possibility of alternative systems? (4) How about systems not accepted as true because distasteful, and agreeable truth accepted without being systematic? Is this last argument an invalid appeal to psychology? No, for there is no 'pure' thought, and without psychological interest, etc., thought could neither progress nor be described. The psychological side of 'system' and 'coherence.' The necessity of immediate apprehension, Coherence feelings. The infinite regress in inference if its immediacy be denied. Non-logical coherence.' Interest as the cause of coherence.
II. Answers psychological. Question as to (1) the psychical nature of the recognition of truth; (2) the objects to which this recognition is referred. (1) Truth as a form of value. Valuation at first random and individual. Question of the ultimateness of the truth-valuation. Meaning 'simple' and 'complex' for a pragmatist psychology. Truth-valuation 'simple' for logic.
III. (2) Objectivity of truth. “Truth' and ‘fact,' 'formal ' as a means to material' truth. Subjective truth-valuations gradually organised (1) into subordination to individual, (2) into conformity with social ends. Usefulness as the principle of selection and criterion of truth. Need for the social recognition of truth. Special cases explained.

Of all philosophic questions that of Truth is perhaps the most hackneyed and unanswerable, when treated in the usual fashion. Now the usual fashion is to indulge either in ecstatic rhapsodies about the sacredness of

  1. ↑ This paper was written for this volume in order to complete, with Axioms as Postulates and the two essays which precede it, the outline of a pragmatist theory of knowledge. It will, I hope, be observed that although these four papers do not of course claim to be exhaustive, they supplement one another.
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