Page:Humanism; philosophical essays (IA cu31924029012171).pdf/50

The idealistic art of passing into 'other' worlds. A visit to Plato in a world of superior 'reality.' The difficulty of proving the reality of such experiences to others unless they lead to useful knowledge. Is the true always useful? Aristotle denies the connexion between theoretic truth and practical use, and prefers the former as higher and diviner. Pragmatist rejection of this dogma of the superior dignity of speculation. Four possibilities as to the relation of Knowledge and Action. (1) Plato's view: Knowledge the presupposition of Action, to which it naturally leads the True the source of the Good; (2) Aristotle's: Pure Knowledge unrelated to Action, the highest Truth to the Good for man; (3) Kant's the same relation, but Action ultimately superior to Knowledge; (4) Pragmatism the converse of Plato's, i.e. Action primary, Knowledge secondary, the Good the source of the True. Critique of Aristotelianism.—(1) 'Truth' not superhuman, but as human as 'Good.' 'True' means true for us as practical beings. The recognition of 'objective truth' a gradual achievement and the construction of a common world in which we can act together. (2) Perceived reality relative to our senses. (3) The 'eternal' truths postulates. (4) Theoretical principles, like practical, get their meaning from their use, and are called 'true' if they prove useful, Hence 'necessary' truth only=needful. Implications of the dicta the true is useful and the useless is false. No really useless knowledge, for the apparently useful is not knowledge. Examples—Knowledge about the Absolute and about an 'other' world unconnected with this.