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ignorance. But once an unknown transfiguration of the actual is desired, it can be sought, and so, in many cases, found. The passionless concatenations of a 'pure' thought never could have reached, and still less have justified, our conclusion: to attain it our thought needs to be impelled and guided by the promptings of volition and desire.

Now that such ways of reasoning are not infrequent and not unsuccessful, will, I fancy, hardly be denied. Indeed if matters were looked into it might easily turn out that reasonings of the second type never really occur in actual knowing, and that when they seem to do so, we have only failed to detect the hidden interest which incites the reason to pretend to be 'dispassionate.' In the example chosen, e.g., it may have been a pessimist's despair that clothed itself in the habiliments of logic, or it may have been merely stupidity and apathy, a want of imagination and enterprise in questioning nature. But, it may be said, the question of the justification de jure of what is done de facto still remains. The votary of an abstract logic may indignantly exclaim―'Shall I lower my ideal of pure thought because there is little. or no pure thinking? Shall I abandon Truth, immutable, eternal, sacred Truth, as unattainable, and sanction as her substitute a spurious concretion of practical experience, on the degrading plea that it is what we need to live by, and all we need to live by? Shall I, in other words, abase myself? No! Perish the thought! Perish the phenomenal embodiment of Pure Reason out of Time and Place (which I popularly term "myself") rather than that the least abatement should be made from the rigorous requirements of my theory of Thought!'

Strong emotional prejudices are always hard to reason with, especially when, as here, their nature is so far misconceived that they are regarded as the revelations