Page:History of Zoroastrianism.djvu/421

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388
EVIL

his creatures without blemish.[1] His mercifulness and omniscience would have demanded this from him.[2]

If it is said that the adversary was created originally good by Ormazd, from whom he afterwards revolted and became evil, then it shows that the adversary possesses a more powerful will than that of the sacred being, since in that event the power of evil is thus able to break his commandment and diffuse more harm in the world than the good of the sacred being.[3] Furthermore, Ormazd, as the almighty being, should not have created an opponent who in the long run, by deluding and misleading mankind, threatened to become triumphant over him.[4] In addition, as the omniscient being, the Deity should have foreseen the consequences and not have produced a rebel for whose existence he would have to be sorry.[5] Moreover, the Evil Spirit should not, under these circumstances, be unreasonably blamed, since he has been created of so headstrong a will by God;[6] on the contrary, the Good Spirit who has created him of such perverse nature should be held accountable for the mischief that the Evil One is now doing in the world.[7]

If it is maintained that Ormazd has created disease and misfortune to give an opportunity to mankind—an opportunity to practise the virtue of mitigating these evils, and thus to be finally rewarded by eternal happiness—it means that he is not actually able to bestow happiness upon the virtuous, except by causing distress to others.[8] Again, to say that he will give recompense to the sick and needy, who have undeservedly suffered in this world, would reflect upon the Good Spirit;[9] for it shows that it was impossible for him to give these unfortunate people happiness in heaven, without first causing them misery in this world.[10] This after-nobility of rewarding after harassing does no credit to the Almighty One.[11] But, the argument continues, Ormazd has neither created Ahriman nor his evil.

From the trend of his argument we might be led to think that our author thus prefers to limit the omnipotence of Ormazd rather than ascribe to him the authorship of evil. But his contention is that inasmuch as Ahriman, who is independent in his origin, will ultimately bow the knee before Ormazd and

  1. Ib., 118.
  2. Ib., 119–124.
  3. Ib., 51, 95–97.
  4. Ib., 85–87.
  5. Ib., 88–94.
  6. Ib., 245–251.
  7. Ib., 257, 258.
  8. Ib., 141–148.
  9. Ib., 149.
  10. Ib., 150.
  11. Ib., 151–154.