Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/134

This page has been validated.

cxxxii

Contents.

	Essay.	Page
C. the President will usually be a man of ability,	No. LXXV.	527
D. the delegation of this authority to one man will beget a livelier sense of duty and greater regard to reputation than the delegation of it to many,		527
E. objection, that it should have been delegated solely to the President, considered,		528
a. all the advantages desired to be gained thereby will be secured by the proposed plan,		528
b. the fact that his choice may be overruled by the Senate considered,		529
c. the necessary concurrence of the Senate will afford a check on the favoritism of the President,		529
F. objection, that the President thereby may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views, considered,		530
a. the integrity of the whole body of the Senate will check such a result,		531
b. the proposed Constitution has guarded against it,		531
G. the consent of the Senate will be necessary to displace as well as to appoint officers of the government,	LXXVI.	532
a. further stability will thereby be secured to the government,		532
H. objection, that the Senate will be unduly controlled by the President, considered,		533
I. objection, that the President will be unduly controlled by the Senate, considered,		533
J. this feature of the proposed Constitution compared with the plan of appointing State officers in New York,		534
K. the impropriety of delegating this authority to a council of appointment,		535
L. the impropriety of admitting the House of Representatives to share in this authority,		536
vii. to communicate information to Congress on the state of the Union,		536
viii. to recommend to Congress the adoption of such measures as he shall consider expedient,		537
ix. to convene one or both branches of the Congress on extraordinary occasions,		537
x. to adjourn the Congress when there is a dis-