Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/133

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Contents.

cxxxi

	Essay.	Page
F. the greater danger is that it will not be used at all times when it may be employed usefully,	No. LXXII.	513
G. the power not being absolute, two thirds of the legislature may successfully resist it,		514
a. a similar power delegated to the "Council of Revision" in New York,		515
b. the Governor of Massachusetts possesses a power similar to that which is here delegated to the Executive,		515
c. the latter preferable to the former,		515
ii. the command of the military and naval forces of the Union,	LXXIII.	516
iii. to require opinions of heads of the executive departments,		516
iv. the power of pardoning offenders against the laws of the Union,		517
A. the propriety of delegating it to a single person considered,		517
B. the propriety of delegating authority to the President to pardon traitors considered,		517
v. in connection with the Senate, to make treaties,	LXXIV.	519
A. one of the best digested features of the proposed Constitution,		519
B. objection, that it unites the executive and legislative departments, considered,		520
a. it is a proper combination of the two departments,		520
b. it is not entirely an executive, nor is it entirely a legislative subject, but combines the nature of both,		520
c. it cannot properly be delegated to an elective Executive alone,		521
d. it cannot properly be delegated to the Senate alone,		522
e. the House of Representatives cannot properly be admitted to share in that power,		523
C. objection, that two thirds of all the Senators should be required, instead of two thirds of those present, considered,		523
vi. in connection with the Senate, to appoint certain public officers,	LXXV.	525
A. this feature of the proposed Constitution is entitled to particular commendation,		526
B. the People at large cannot exercise this power,		526