Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/117

This page has been validated.
Contents.
cxv
Essay. Page
ii. the superior power of the militia to resist and overcome it, No. XLV. 331
l. concluding remarks on this particular branch of the subject, 332
C. concluding remarks, on the danger that the Fœderal powers will be formidable to reserved powers of individual States, 333
b. "the particular structure of the Fœderal government and the distribution of its powers among its constituent parts," XLVI. 333
a. "its supposed violation of the maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct," considered, 333
A. the truth of the maxim conceded, 334
B. the proposed Constitution does not violate it, 334
a. the meaning of the maxim discussed, 334
i. the views of Montesquieu examined, 334
i. the British Constitution, as his standard of government, referred to, 334
ii. his own expressed reasons referred to, 335
ii. the provisions of the State constitutions, relative thereto, examined, 337
i. New Hampshire, 337
ii. Massachusetts, 338
iii. New York, 339
iv. New Jersey, 339
v. Pennsylvania, 339
vi. Delaware, 340
vii. Maryland, 340
viii. Virginia, 340
ix. North Carolina. 341
x. South Carolina, 341
xi. Georgia, 341
xii. general remarks on the State constitutions, 342
b. the necessity that "these departments shall be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others," considered, XLVII. 342
i. "the powers belonging to one department ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the others," conceded, 343
ii. "neither of them ought to possess an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their powers," conceded, 343
iii. what practical security can be provided for each, against the invasion of the others, considered, 343
This article is issued from Wikisource. The text is available under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 unless otherwise noted. Additional terms may apply for the media files.