Page:Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism.djvu/99

evidently absurd. The consequence respecting man would be, that the higher the degree of excellence he attained, the less free he would become, as he could not advance toward perfection without becoming subjected to the influence of good; and he could not yield to the sway of truth without removing himself from the rule of evil. He must necessarily remove himself from under the sway of the one, in the same degree that he subjects himself to the other; and as this must alter, more or less, according to the measure of his perfection, the equilibrium between these two contrary influences, his freedom, that is, his power of choice, must therefore be diminished to the same extent that this equilibrium is disturbed. If we place the highest perfection of man in the annihilation of one of these opposing elements, and take it for granted that perfect freedom consists in the power of choosing between these antagonistic solicitations, it is evident that, between the perfection and the freedom of man, there is a patent contradiction and an absolute incompatibility. The absurdity of this deduction consists in this, that man being free, and at the same time aiming at perfection, he cannot preserve his freedom without renouncing perfection, neither can he become perfect without losing his liberty.

As relates to God, the consequence of this hypothesis would be this, that God, not being subject in his nature to contradictory solicitations, would not be free, if freedom consisted in the full power to choose between opposing solicitations; and if, according to this supposition, he must have the power to choose between good and evil, between sanctity and sin, in order to be free, then there exists, between the nature of God and liberty thus defined, a radical contradiction and an absolute