Page:Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism.djvu/50

from discussion, if it does not previously exist in those who argue; and it cannot exist in those who argue, if it does not also exist in those who govern. If infallibility is an attribute of human nature, it is found in the first as well as in the second; but if it is not an attribute of human nature, neither the first nor the second possess it. Either all are infallible or all are fallible. The question then is to decide whether human nature is fallible or infallible, which question resolves itself into this other: whether human nature is in a sound condition or vitiated and fallen.

According to the first supposition, infallibility, an essential quality of a sound understanding, is the first and greatest of all its attributes, and from this principle the following consequences naturally follow: If the reason of man is infallible because it is sound, it cannot err because it is infallible; if it cannot err because it is infallible, then all men possess the truth, no matter whether we consider them collectively or separately. If all men possess the truth, either singly or collectively considered, then all their affirmations and negations are necessarily identical. If all their affirmations and negations are identical, discussion is inconceivable and absurd.

According to the second supposition, fallibility is a weakness of human reason, and is the first and greatest of human imperfections; and proceeding from this principle are the following consequences: If the reason of man is fallible because it is infirm, it can never be certain of discerning the truth, because it is fallible; if it can never be sure of the truth because it is fallible, then this uncertainty is an essential characteristic of all men, whether we consider them singly or in the aggre-