Page:Essays Vol 1 (Ives, 1925).pdf/282
262 ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE
CHAPTER XXX
OF MODERATION
Tue motto for this chapter might be taken from Moliére’s Misanthrope:
La parfaite raison fuit toute extremité Et veut que l’on soit sage avec sobrieté,
“Moderation” was the law of Montaigne’s life, but he treats of it without any special eloquence or force, and with only limited illustra- tions. He repeats here in other words the observation he has already made in the fifteenth Essay, that all virtues, if too extravagantly prac- tised, may become vices.!
The quotation from St. Paul he here makes use of was one of the many inscriptions in his library. In 1775 the question was proposed by the French Academy, as the subject for a prize of eloquence: “En quoi consiste l’esprit philosophique conformément & ces paroles: Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere?” This question has not yet been answered. Is it asked as often as it might be?
We find here one of the few cheerless passages of the Essays, that which begins: “Is not man a pitiful creature?” a cheerlessness oc- casioned by facts existing fat more in Montaigne’s day than, happily, in our own. From this “impression” we pass on rather disconnectedly to the matter of human sacrifice — with a word about “the new regions discovered in our time, still pure and undefiled in comparison with our own.” The Essay concludes with a story about Cortez.
S if our touch were infection, we by our handling cor- rupt things which in themselves are beautiful and good. We can lay hold of virtue in such wise that it will become thereby vicious, if we em-
brace it with too eager and violent a passion. Those who say that there is never excess in virtue, because it is no longer virtue if there be excess, play with words.
Insani sapiens nomen ferat, sequus iniqui, Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam.?
1 The opposite view has also been maintained. “Jacobi,” says Emer- son, “refusing all measure of right and wrong except the determination of the private spirit, remarks that there is no crime but has some- times been a virtue.” (“The Transcendentalist.”) It isa pity that this thesis did not occur to Montaigne; one would like to see what he would have made of it.
2 The wise man would deserve to be called a fool, and the just man unjust, if he seek virtue itself to excess. — Horace, Epistles, I, 6.15.