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will not be sufficient to account for this significance without associating with a second.
With regard to time, if it is to be thought of as a measure, we must determine what it is that applies this measure. It must clearly be either Soul or the Present Moment. If on the contrary we take time to be something measured and regard it as being of such and such extension—a year, for examplethen we may consider it as a quantity: essentially however time is of a different nature; the very fact that we can attribute this or that length to it shows us that it is not length: in other words, time is not Quantity. Quantity in the strict sense is the Quantity not inbound with things; if things became quantities by mere participation in Quantity, then (not only time but) Substance itself would be identical with Quantity.
Equality and inequality must be regarded as properties of Quantity- Absolute, not of the participants, or of them not essentially but only accidentally: such participants as "three yards' length," which becomes a quantity, not as belonging to a single genus of Quantity, but by being subsumed under the one head, the one category.
6.
In considering Relation we must enquire whether it possesses the community of a genus, or whether it may on other grounds be treated as a unity.
Above all, has Relation—for example, that of right and left, double and half—any actuality? Has it, perhaps, actuality in some cases only, as for instance in what is termed "posterior" but not in what is termed "prior"? Or is its actuality in no case conceivable?
What meaning, then, are we to attach to double and half and all other cases of less and more; to habit and disposition, reclining, sitting, standing to father, son, master, slave; to like, unlike, equal, unequal; to active and passive, measure and measured; or again to knowledge and sensation, as related respectively to the knowable and the sensible?
Knowledge, indeed, may be supposed to entail in relation to the known object some actual entity corresponding to that object's Ideal Form,