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iii. 2; and Lucian, Nigr. 32). The original fables were in prose, and were turned into verse by several writers; the first, after the example of Socrates, being Demetrius Phalereus. Next appeared an edition in elegiac verse, often cited by Suidas, but the author's name is unknown; then Babrius, an excellent Greek poet, turned them into choliambics (i.e. limping iambics); but of ten books, a few fables only are preserved entire. Of the Latin writers of Æsopean fables, Phædrus is the most celebrated.

The fables now extant in prose under Æsop's name are entirely spurious, as is proved by Bentley in his Dissertation on the Fables of Æsop, and have been assigned an oriental origin. The identification of Æsop with the Arabian philosopher and fabulist Lokman (who is made by some traditions the contemporary of the psalmist David) has frequently been attempted; and the Persian accounts of Lokman, which among other things describe him as an ugly black slave, appear to have been blended by the author of the Life, published by Planudes, with the classical stories respecting Æsop. The similarity of the fables ascribed to each renders it probable that they were derived from the same Indo-Persian source, or from the Chinese, who appear to have possessed such fables in very remote antiquity. A complete collection of the Æsopean fables, 231 in number, was published at Breslau by J. G. Schneider in 1810.

Æsop, a Greek historian, whose life of Alexander the Great is preserved in a Latin translation by Julius Valerius. It is a work of no credit, abounding in errors.

Æsop, Clodius, a celebrated actor, who flourished about the 670th year of Rome. He and Roscius were contemporaries, and the best performers who ever appeared upon the Roman stage; the former excelling in tragedy, the latter in comedy. Cicero was on the intimate terms with both actors, and put himself under their direction to perfect his action. Æsop performed many friendly services to Cicero, especially during the period of his banishment. He appears to have spared no pains to improve himself in his art, and to have always studied his part with the greatest care. On the stage his declamation was emphatic and his action vehement, and he became entirely absorbed in his part. Plutarch mentions it as reported of him, that while he was representing Atreus deliberating how he should revenge himself on Thyestes, he forgot himself so far in the heat of action that with his truncheon he struck and killed one of the servants crossing the stage. His age and the time of his death are uncertain; but he made his last appearance on the stage in B.C. 55, at the dedication of Pompey's threatre, on which occasion his voice failed him. Æsop lived in a somewhat expensive manner; but he nevertheless contrived to leave an ample fortune to his spendthrift son. This is the son of Æsop mentioned by Horace (Sat. iii. 3, 239) as taking a pearl from the eardrop of Cæcilia Metella, and dissolving it in vinegar, that he might have the satisfaction of swallowing eight thousand pounds' worth at a draught.

Æsthetics is the term now employed to designate the theory of the Fine Arts—the science of the Beautiful, with its allied conceptions and emotions. The province of the science is not, however, very definitely fixed, and there is still some ambiguity about the meaning of the term, arising from its etymology and various use. The word æsthetic, in its original Greek form (αἰσθητικός), means anything that has to do with perception by the senses, and this wider connotation was retained by Kant, who, under the title Transcendental Æsthetic, treats of the a priori principles of all sensuous knowledge. The limitation of the term to the comparatively narrow class of sensations and perceptions occupied with the Beautiful and its allied properties is due to the Germans, and primarily to Baumgarten, who started from the supposition that, just as truth is the end and perfection of pure knowledge. Yet, spite of these sources of vagueness in the subject and its name, some considerable part of the theory can be looked upon as pretty clearly defined, and it may be possible, by means of careful reflection on this ascertainable quantity, to indicate, roughly at least, the extent and boundaries of a complete system of æsthetic doctrine.

A very brief survey of what has been written under the name æsthetics is sufficient to show that it includes, as its first and foremost problem, the determination of the nature and laws of Beauty, including along with the Beautiful, in its narrower signification, its kindred subjects, the Sublime and the Ludicrous. To discover what it is in things which makes them beautiful or ugly, sublime or ludicrous, is one constant factor in the æsthetic problem. Intimately connected with this objective question is the subjective and psychological inquiry into the nature of the feelings and ideas that have beauty for their object. Further, it will be found that all attempts to construct a complete æsthetic theory aim at determining the highest ends of the Fine Arts (which obviously concern themselves largely, if not exclusively, with the Beautiful), and at marking out the distinctions and tracing the dependencies of natural and artistic beauty. All this part of the field of æsthetic inquiry seems fairly agreed on, and it is only when we approach other sides of the Fine Arts that the precise scope of the science appears obscure. But while there is this measure of agreement as to the proper subject matter of æsthetics, we find two diametrically opposed methods of approaching it, which distinctly colour all parts of the doctrine arrive at, and impose different limitations to the boundaries of the subject. The first is the metaphysical or a priori methods; the second the scientific or empirical method. The one reasons deductively from ultra-scientific conceptions respecting the ultimate nature of the universe and human intelligence, and seeks to explain the phenomena of beauty and art by help of these. The other proceeds inductively from the consideration of these phenomena, as facts capable of being compared, classified, and brought under certain uniformities. At the same time, it must not be supposed that either method is customarily pursued in complete independence of the other. The most subtle exponent of transcendentalism in art appeals to generalisations drawn from the facts of art; nor have the professedly scientific critics often abstained from introducing conceptions and hypotheses of a metaphysical character.

Metaphysical speculation in æsthetics centres about the objective nature of beauty, and arises somewhat in the following manner:—The appreciation of the Beautiful is a mode of perception. In estimating a beautiful landscape or a beautiful statue, the mind perceives the beauty as a property of the object. It is, morever, a single property; the name beautiful always denoting the same essential thing, whatever this may be. Now we find that it is not a simple property of matter known through one particular class of sensations, as colour; and the question arises, what it really is in itself, whether inherent in and inseparable from matter, or something superior to it, and if so, how revealed through it. The directions of this inquiry have been almost as numerous as the systems of metaphysical thought. On the supposition of a real substance matter, independent