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Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation’s security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.[1]
Consistent with this discussion, a U.S. person engaged in political action or other non-intelligence gathering activity also may fall within the definition of an agent of a foreign power. This is the case if the person knowingly aids or abets, or conspires with:
any person who … pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States.[2]
Because these other activities may come closer to activity protected by the First Amendment, the required level of criminal involvement is higher in this definition. The House Report explains that:
[T]he activities engaged in must presently involve or be about to involve a violation of Federal criminal law. Again, this is a higher standard than is found in the other definitions, where the activities “may” involve a violation of law. In this area where there is close [sic] line between protected First Amendment activity and the activity giving rise to surveillance, it is most important that where surveillance does occur the activity be such that it involves or is about to involve a violation of a Federal criminal statute.[3]
The House Report also discusses the “aiding or abetting” provision at length and says that FISA:
allows surveillance of any person, including a U.S. person, who knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described …. The knowledge requirement is applicable to both the status of the person being aided by the proposed subject of the surveillance and the nature of the activity being promoted. This standard requires the Government to establish probable cause that the prospective target knows both that the person with whom he is conspiring or whom he is aiding or abetting is engaged in the described activities as an agent of
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