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The guidelines did not include an explicit requirement to document whether the person had previously been a source of an intelligence or law enforcement agency.[1] Moreover, the FBI was not required to seek or obtain the approval of the Department before using sources to record conversations and obtain information not only from targets of its investigations in Crossfire Hurricane (such as Page and Papadopoulos) but also from a senior campaign official to whom its sources had access.[2]

4. Analytic integrity

The FBI’s Counterintelligence Division is an operational component, whereas a separate Directorate of Intelligence provides analytic support.[3] The Counterintelligence Division’s policy guidance says that “[e]ffective … operations are based on integration” of personnel from the two entities who work “toward common goals.” Division personnel “must cultivate and develop relationships” with Directorate of Intelligence elements “in order to maximize operational performance.” Case agents “should rely on” the Directorate of Intelligence “for strategic and tactical guidance on targeting priorities, the generation of source debriefing packages, the evaluation of source reporting, preparation of various raw intelligence dissemination products, and the identification of intelligence gaps.”[4]

For the Intelligence Community as a whole, Congress has directed the Director of National Intelligence (“DNI”) to assign a person or entity “to be responsible for ensuring that finished intelligence products … are timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based upon all sources of available intelligence, and employ the standards of proper analytic tradecraft.”[5] The Intelligence Community’s Analytic Standards say that analysts “must perform their functions with objectivity and with awareness of their own assumptions and reasoning.”[6] They are to “employ reasoning techniques and practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate bias.”[7] Moreover, “[a]ll IC analytic products” should be “[i]ndependent of political consideration” and “not be distorted by … advocacy of a particular … agenda … or policy viewpoint.”[8]

Responding to a congressional inquiry, the Intelligence Community’s Analytic Ombudsman documented “a few incidents” from 2020 “where individuals, or groups of

  1. ↑ See id. § II.A.3.
  2. ↑ See AGG-Dom §§ V.A.4; VII.O (authorizing consensual monitoring as a technique and requiring Department approval in a “sensitive monitoring circumstance,” but not including the monitoring of campaign officials as such a circumstance); see also Redacted OIG Review at 30.
  3. ↑ The Directorate of Intelligence is part of the FBI’s Intelligence Branch. See FBI Leadership & Structure – Intelligence Branch, https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure.
  4. ↑ FBI Counterintelligence Division, Counterintelligence Division Policy Directive and Policy Guide § 5.1 (Nov. 1, 2018) (emphases added).
  5. ↑ 50 U.S.C. § 3364(a).
  6. ↑ Intelligence Community Directive 203, Analytic Standards at 2 (Jan. 2, 2015).
  7. ↑ Id.
  8. ↑ Id.

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