Page:Critique of Pure Reason 1855 Meiklejohn tr.djvu/179

time, in which all changes of phænomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it is that in which succession and co-existence can be represented only as determinations thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object of perception. It follows that in objects of perception, that is, in phænomena, there must be found a substratum which represents time in general, and in which all change or co-existence can be perceived by means of the relation of phænomena to it. But the substratum of all reality, that is, of all that pertains to the existence of things, is substance; all that pertains to existence can be cogitated only as a determination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to which alone can all relations of time in phænomena be determined, is substance in the world of phænomena, that is, the real in phænomena, that which, as the substratum of all change, remains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot change in existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor diminished.

Our apprehension of the manifold in a phænomenon is always successive, is consequently always changing. By it alone we could, therefore, never determine whether this manifold, as an object of experience, is co-existent or successive, unless it had for a foundation something that exists always, that is, something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and co-existence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). Only in the permanent, then, are reations of time possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time); that is to say, the permanent is the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all determination of time is possible. Permanence is, in fact, just another expression for time, as the abiding correlate of all existence of phænomena, and of all change, and of all coexistence. For change does not affect time itself, but only the phænomena in time (just as coexistence cannot be regarded as a modus of time itself, seeing that in time no parts are co-existent, but all successive).^[1] If we were to attribute succession to time itself, we should be obliged to cogitate another time, in which this succession would be possible. It is only by means of the permanent that existence