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Saionji continuing as Premier and the Seiyukai as the strongest party in the House of Representatives, passed off quietly.
The twenty-fifth session illustrated what Uyehara[1] calls “one of the anomalies of Japanese domestic politics.” The Seiyukai, in a majority in the House of Representatives, supported the non-party Katsura Cabinet, which had been organized when Saionji, for some unaccountable reason, resigned. It would seem that, as Uyehara suggests,[2] the Seiyukai had no other course, except to run the risk of a dissolution and the loss of their majority in an expensive election.
The twenty-sixth and the twenty-seventh sessions continued this anomaly, which Katsura called a “Rapprochement Policy.” But the Seiyukai were enabled during these sessions to obtain from Katsura some concessions in return for their support. For instance, the Government was compelled to agree to a slight reduction of the land-tax, a reassessment of the taxable value of land, a revised tariff, etc. Moreover, attention must be called to the budget for 1909–1910. The Japan Mail said:
It may be described broadly as the first really sound document of its kind which a Japanese Cabinet has been in a position to compile for some years, since it brings expenditures strictly within the limits of visible income and since it makes no draft upon contingent assets.
When the twenty-eighth session met, it found Saionji again at the post of Premier, with the Seiyukai in a majority in the House of Representatives, so that everything passed off smoothly.
The twenty-ninth session was a special one, necessitated by the death of the Emperor Mutsuhito, and was marked by perfect unanimity.
The thirtieth session was a stormy one from the very outset. The Saionji Cabinet had been wrecked by the demand of the War Minister (Gen. Uyehara) for an increase of the
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