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his will that light and colours should seem to be without the soul, that heat should seem to be in the fire, pain in the hand, &c.) but also that it is a natural and necessary condition of their visibility; I would say, that though God should be supposed to make a world, or any one visible object, which is granted to be not external, yet by the condition of its being seen, it would, and must be quasi external to the perceptive faculty; as much so to the full, as is any material object usually seen in this visible world.
Moreover, thirdly, when I affirm that all matter exists dependantly on mind, I am sure my reader will allow me to say, I do not mean by this, that matter or bodies exist in bodies. As for instance, when I affirm or say, that the world, which I see exists in my mind, I cannot be supposed to mean that one body exists in another, or that all the bodies which I see exist in that, which common use has taught me to call my body. I must needs desire to have this remembered, because experience has taught me how apt persons are, or will be, to mistake me in this particular.3
Fourthly, when I affirm that this or that visible object exists in, or dependantly on, my mind, or perceptive faculty, I must desire to be understood to mean no more than I say, by the words mind and perceptive faculty. In like manner I would be understood, when I affirm in general, that all matter or body exists in, or dependantly on, mind. I