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things, such as trees, houses, &c. which are seen, as we say, in a looking-glass, but which are, or ought to be owned to have no existence but in, or respectively on, the minds or faculties of those who perceive them. But to please all parties at once, I affirm that I know of no manner, in which an object of perception exists in, or on, its respective faculty, which I will not admit in this place, to be a just description of that manner of in-existence, after which all matter that exists, is affirmed by me to exist in mind. Nevertheless, were I to speak my mind freely, I should chuse to compare it to the in-existence of some, rather than some other objects of perception, particularly such as are objects of the sense of vision; and of these, those more especially, which are allowed by others, to exist wholly in the mind or visive faculty; such as objects seen in a looking glass, by men distempered, light-headed, ecstatic, &c. where not only colours, but intire bodies, are perceived or seen. For these cases are exactly parallel, with that existence which I affirm of all matter, body, or extension whatsoever.

Having endeavoured, in as distinct terms as I can, to give my reader notice of what I mean by the proposition I have undertaken the defence of, it will be requisite in the next place, to declare in as plain terms, what I do not mean by it.

Accordingly, I declare in the first place, that in affirming that there is no external world, I make