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The Joint Chiefs of Staff would then determine if there was a requirement for joint testing of the Army's concept during calendar year 1965.
Meanwhile Strike Command was left with the responsibility for conducting joint training and testing of the Air Force concept through division level. The 1st Infantry Division subsequently was made available for this purpose.
The Strike Command-sponsored joint test and evaluation exercise, GOLD FIRE I, was conducted in Missouri at about the same time at the Army was conducting its final test program with the air assault division. It soon became evident that the Air Force concept, rather than dealing in innovations, embraced improving streamlined sustained execution of a long-established concept; namely, tactical air support of ground forces. It proved that with overwhelming use of dedicated Air Force support, a standard Army division had increased potential. The joint exercise provided few surprises.
General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, United States Army, in discussing the differences between the tests of the 11th Air Assault Division and the test sponsored by Strike Command of an Army division supported by the Air Force, remarked: "I had the rare privilege of seeing the 11th Air Assault one week and the other concept at the early part of the following week, and I would make a comparison of perhaps a gazelle and an elephant. The two are not comparable. Each of them has its role to play, and it is important that we continue to pursue in this area where we have made such significant strides the gains that we already have."
At the last moment, General Rosson was told by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 September 1964 to carry out an independent U.S. Strike Command evaluation of the Army's AIR ASSAULT II and on 6 October 1964 the guidance was modified to state that a comparative evaluation of GOLD FIRE I and AIR ASSAULT II would not be undertaken but rather directed a separate and independent evaluation of the Army exercise.
The interim final report on the tests of the 11th Air Assault which was submitted on 1 December 1964 essentially wrapped up twenty-one months of intensive, almost feverish, activity by thousands of highly specialized personnel. General Rich's final plea had been that this organization not be dispersed to the winds. It was now up to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine its future.
The Army had convinced itself, and a large body of people throughout the military establishment, that further large scale