Page:Airmobility 1961-1971.pdf/73
[integra]tion of heliborne lift as a primary means of maneuver, accompanied by readily available aerial fires and by highly responsive aerial reconnaissance and support systems. In my opinion, the combat power offered at these three levels rises on a geometric, rather than an arithmetic scale, and only at the third level do we find a new potential in the tempo of operations, in range over extended distances and in freedom from heretofore formidable terrain obstacles.
Joint Considerations
As early as 17 January 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had envisioned testing the airmobile concept under the supervision of U.S. Strike Command. It was originally conceived that this would be a complete comparative evaluation of the Army and Air Force airmobility concepts to include division-size joint exercises. General Rosson was designated by General Paul D. Adams, Commanding General, U.S. Strike Command, to form a Joint Test and Evaluation Task Force to plan and fulfill its requirement. As mentioned earlier, the Army was concerned that it would be pushed into such a test before it had fully organized and trained its own airmobile units. The Air Force, on the other hand, had been pushing for a joint test of its own concepts ever since the Disosway report on the Howze Board.
At the heart of the Air Force concept was the contention that within a joint force the Army Reorganization Objective Army division supported by Air Force tactical air offered a more practical and economical means for enhancing the mobility and combat effectiveness of Army units than did the Army air assault division. Selective tailoring of the Reorganization Objective Army division was seen as permitting varying degrees of airtransportability and combat capability ranging from a relatively light mobile force to one capable of sustained combat, all without recourse to specialized Army airmobile units. As visualized by the Air Force, neither Army fixed-wing aircraft or medium helicopters were required for tactical movement of troops or delivery of supplies. It was their contention that the Air Force C-130 could do the majority of the air transport mission while other Air Force aircraft provided reconnaissance and firepower.
On 5 March 1964 a decision by the Secretary of Defense produced far-reaching effects on the U.S. Strike Command test and evaluation effort. This decision allowed the Army to proceed with its unilateral tests during the latter part of calendar year 1964. Thereafter, the Army was to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff what aspect, if any, warranted validation by joint testing.