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can widely disperse and yet, when required, quickly mass (even over irradiated ground, blown down forests or rubbled cities), strike an enemy, then disperse again.
On 1 December 1964 General Rich forwarded his interim report of the Air Assault test of the Commanding General, Combat Developments Command. He noted that this examination of a particular division slice had not set the lower or upper limits to the airmobility potential but it had provided clear indications of the possible and practical advantages to be gained. His recommendations were as follows:
First, I urge that the two years of effort, the experience of the people on hand, and the equipment on hand not be lost by the dissipation, fragmentation, or dispersal of the tested units. Second, I strongly recommend that the 11th Air Assault Division or a division strength unit with the airmobility capability of the 11th AAD be included in the Army's force structure with a full parachute capability for its non-aviation elements; and the 10th Air Transport Brigade be retained intact and included in the Army's force structure. The significant question is not whether we can afford such organizations, but whether this nation, with its rapidly expanding population and ever-increasing GNP can afford NOT to have them. The tested organization are prototypes, in being, of the most versatile forces that we can add to the United States Army. The movement capability of all divisions, including the 11th Air Assault Division has bene enhanced by Air Force aircraft; however, the integration of Army aircraft into these tested units has provided the crucial maneuver capability of light mobile forces to close with and destroy the enemy. In combination with ROAD divisions and other standard Army organizations, airmobile units offer a balance of mobility and an increased Army combat readiness on a theater scale that is applicable to the entire spectrum of warfare.
Though not part of the formal report, General Rich made one further observation on the fundamental concept of airmobility.
I wish to distinguish between three fundamental levels of airmobility. First, an aviation unit can be given to a combat force on a temporary basis for a specific operation. This is equivalent to a corps truck company attached to a division for a one time move. Such an operation involves two separate staffs working out detailed plans to integrate the SOP's and techniques of two separately trained organizations. The second level is represented by the organic aviation in a ROAD Division. This approach benefits from unity of command, day-to-day training and intangibles such as esprit. But it is limited to a company lift capability; does not permit replacement of ground vehicles by aircraft; its equipment is not tailored to aircraft capabilities; and it could never represent the primary thrust of the division. At the third level a much greater gain is possible when the organization is specifically trained and equipped to exploit the continuing close tactical integra[tion]