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[condi]tions were worsened by gusty winds and low-hanging haze and fog. All the airlines on the eastern seacoast had ceased operating since turbulence above 1,000 feet was so severe that instrument flying was not feasible. Despite this, the operation jumped off only one hour behind schedule with the movement of one air assault infantry brigade by 120 helicopters over a distance of 100 nautical miles precisely on their objective. A year and a half of training had paid off.
For four weeks the test units maneuvered throughout the Carolinas in offensive, defensive, and retrograde movements. The umpires were hard-pressed to keep up with the tempo and the collection of "hard data," by being in the right spot at the right time, became their primary concern. So much was happening concurrently over such a large area that control of the enthusiastic units being tested was a constant problem. It was a tribute to both the tested units and the umpire personnel that the scenario remained recognizable. To compound the problem, hundreds of distinguished visitors wanted to witness this critical testing period.
It is interesting to compare the comments of the two major commanders of the units in AIR ASSAULT II, Major General Robert H. York, who commanded the aggressor force of the 82d Airborne Division, and General Kinnard, who commanded the 11th Air Assault Division and attached units.
General York said:
Air assault operations as pioneered on Exercise AIR ASSAULT II have a dynamic potential. Seldom do we see a new military concept which can contribute so decisively throughout the entire spectrum of warfare. Certain air assault techniques used during Exercise AIR ASSAULT II would be unacceptably hazardous in actual combat. However, these deficiencies can be corrected and do not detract from the validity of the overall concept.
General Kinnard looked beyond the scenario of AIR ASSAULT II and said:
Beyond what I believe to be its capabilities to perform roles normal to other divisions, I am even more impressed by what I feel is its ability to perform in unique ways beyond the abilities of other divisions. For example, in a low scale war, I believe it can exert control over a much wider area and with much more speed and flexibility and with much less concern for the problems of interdicted ground communications or of difficult terrain. In higher scales of war, I see in this division an unparalleled reserve or screening force capable of operating over very large frontages. By properly picking times, places, and methods, I believe it can also operate with devastating effect against the rear of the enemy. Faced with threat or use of nuclear weapons, I believe it