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test program and submitted a varied array of new equipment items for testing. Aviation weather minimums were relaxed to permit the launching of airmobile operations depending on the state of training and the skill of the flight crews. Particular attention was given to night operations.

Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stockton's 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion—the first in the Army—spent much of its time experimenting with methods of moving long distances through very low weather and improving their own lighting systems for tight formation flying at night. The Chinook Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S. Silver, Jr. struggled with a newly developed machine, with the attending problems of maintenance and spare parts, to find new methods of moving artillery and key supplies. The 10th Air Transport Brigade, under Colonel Delbert L. Bristol, with a combination of Caribous and Chinooks devised the first workable air line of communications.

While the test units were being formed and organized, considerable thought was being given to the methodology that would have to be developed to objectively test such large organizations. There had been no tests of this type since the years just prior to World War II, when the Army tested its "new" triangular division concept. And even this test never approached the scope of the Air Assault Tests. There had been, of course, many large unit field exercises, but these took the form of training tests rather than concept tests. Furthermore, the evaluation of exercises of this type had been based solely on military judgment and opinion.^[1]

Lieutenant General C.W.G. Rich, who was assigned the overall responsibility as test director on 1 August 1964, was given the mission to test a concept, and base the evaluation of this concept on scientific principles. He charged the Test Evaluation and Control Group, headed by General Williams, to establish a new methodology based on evaluation of the combat systems and how these systems interacted with each other. A scientific element, staffed by systems analysts from the Combat Operations Research Group, advised and assisted the evaluation group. In the final phases of evaluation there were 376 permanent members of the Test and Evaluation Group as well as 1,596 temporary personnel.

The main problem facing the Test and Evaluation Group was the difficulty of isolating what was being tested. Test units were developing procedures, detailed tactics, and techniques through